

Political Process Model of Hybridization:
The Muslim Brotherhood and the Free Officers' Legacy

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Introduction

The historical trajectory of the Muslim Brotherhood is long and complex. Founded in 1928 as the first Islamist organization, Hassan al-Banna envisioned his group as the vanguard of resistance against Western influence and hegemony in his native Egypt. A translation of the Brotherhood's original constitution enumerates six "Aims and Objectives," all of which deal directly with improving the plight of the downtrodden Egyptian, often the victim of an unforgiving capitalist system. The document suggests that much of society's ills are directly related to the absence of Islamic laws and principles, and restoring said values is the only viable alternative.¹ Banna's constitution also specifies four methods for attaining a more ideal society. Among these are propaganda, education, direction (services) and activities. Each of these strategies indicates a non-violent, activist spirit within the nascent organization.

As the membership within the Brotherhood burgeoned, the organization began to clash with the establishment. "Establishment" in this context refers to the Saadist regimes of the 1930's and 1940's. With a membership of nearly half a million members by the mid-1940's, the Brotherhood represented a powerful entity which fundamentally opposed secular government in Egypt. As a result, the establishment exercised various repressive tactics to impede the Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood retaliated with strategic acts of violence, breaking with the peaceful activism described in its founding documents. A riot in Cairo in 1948 ended with the death of notorious police commander, Salim Zaki. Although it was impossible to determine the actual culprit of the assassination, the government was quick to blame the Muslim Brotherhood. The organization was banned, and all assets were appropriated by the ministry of social affairs. The Brotherhood was accused of intending an

“overthrow of the political order” through “terrorism” and represented “pressing danger to the security and existence of the state.”ⁱⁱ

By 1949, Hassan al-Banna was dead by assassination, and the organization entered a new period characterized by its extra-parliamentary political status. The government maintained its ban on the Brotherhood, yet the organization remained strong in membership. As the election of 1950 became a prominent political topic, the Wafdist party began actively courting the influential Brotherhood for support. A report by Jefferson Caffery, American Ambassador to Egypt, indicates the nature of this relationship between the Wafd and the Brotherhood:

In its election propaganda prior to the elections of last January, the Wafd had clearly implied that, if it came to power, it would lift the ban on the [Muslim Brotherhood].ⁱⁱⁱ

The Wafd recognized the potential of mobilizing the vast network of the Brotherhood, and created incentives to entice the organization. A renewed status of legality was certainly beneficial to the Brotherhood in that it could reemerge in the public sphere. For the Brothers, the possibility of reinstatement represented the most fundamental goal of the immediate future. A Brotherhood spokesman articulated this stance saying that “[t]he Wafd is the popular party of Egypt and its followers come from the same classes as the partisans of the Muslim Brothers – the popular classes.”^{iv} The Brotherhood tactfully maneuvered this political game by implying an inherent alliance with the Wafd. It was with this support that the Wafd successfully defeated the Saadists and rose to power.

Although the Brotherhood never achieved full legality under the Wafdist regime, its role in the Free Officers Revolt of 1952 redeemed the organization’s political legitimacy. The Muslim Brotherhood had always maintained a close relationship with the state military wing, and many Egyptian soldiers also belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, the

Brotherhood represented a natural ally for the Free Officers in their preparation to overthrow the establishment. Gamal Abdel Nasser assumed the Egyptian presidency in 1954, and reinstated the ban on the Brotherhood that very year. As I will discuss later, Nasser was highly effective at containing opposition politics and preempted much of the Brotherhood's organizational activity.

Nasser's successors were not quite as successful at containing Islamist opposition. Anwar El Sadat was the first to assume the presidency after Nasser, and was gunned down by a non-Brotherhood Islamist militant in 1981. Hosni Mubarak succeeded Sadat and remained in power for over three decades. The Egyptian system under Mubarak has experienced significant changes, primarily with regards to toleration of opposition politics. The Muslim Brotherhood remained a banned party under Mubarak, yet it rebranded itself over the course of several decades as the moderate Islamist party in Egypt. In contrast to more extremist organizations such as Islamic Jihad and al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya, the Brotherhood is explicitly non-violent.^v

The primary goal of this moderate brand of Islamism is to induce social change by winning the support of the populace through education and preaching. I will later argue that opposition by moderate groups in a semi-open political system is more likely to be tolerated by the establishment. The Muslim Brotherhood exploits its status as a minor threat to the Mubarak regime, and has successfully integrated in the mainstream Egyptian political scheme. By co-opting the leadership of various professional organizations over the course of several decades, the Brotherhood employed institutionalized avenues for political activism. Surrogate political organizations such as the Islamic Trend are a vehicle for the Brotherhood

to enter the Egyptian parliamentary system and challenge the policies of the regime by legitimate means.

The primary concern of this paper is to determine those factors that provided for the Brotherhood's transition from a militant group on the periphery to a moderate opposition group within the mainstream. My analysis assumes a dually faceted approach accounting for the role of both the regime and the social insurgency itself. I incorporate the theories of authoritarian hybridization to rationalize the behavior of the Egyptian regime since 1952. The transition from strict authoritarianism to a hybrid regime allows for the emergence of a political opportunity structure (POS) favorable to a social insurgency. POS as an element of the political process model (PPM) contends that the proper circumstances facilitate the emergence of a social insurgency. POS also relies on organizational actors to motivate social insurgency. My analysis will account for the environmental characteristics that engendered such a POS for the Muslim Brotherhood, while also interpreting the actions of the regime and the Brotherhood. In analyzing the policies of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak I will seek to determine those fundamental elements that allowed for the Brotherhood's emergence in the Egyptian parliamentary system. From abandoning violence to legally attaining control of professional unions, the Muslim Brotherhood leveraged its political clout by exploiting favorable POS's.

My argument relies on several seminal works of social movement theory. The primary text, written by Doug McAdam, argues against the classical model of social movement theory and espouses a more nuanced version: PPM. I draw heavily on McAdam's model, which accounts for a range of phenomena that I will discuss in the upcoming chapters. McAdam analyzes the environmental circumstances that prove most conducive for the

survival of a social movement. His theory is also applicable to the organizational decision making of the Brotherhood, and accounts for its emergence as a significant parliamentary entity.

My argument also incorporates ideas from the work of Banu Eligur and Carrie Rosefsky Wickham. These scholars provide analysis of the rise of Islamism in Turkey and Egypt. Both works incorporate the theories of McAdam, applying social movement theory to the context of Islamism. Wickham follows the trajectory of Islamist groups in Egypt from the days of effective repression under Nasser to the semi-open political system under Mubarak. Wickham describes the Muslim Brotherhood's emergence in mainstream Egyptian politics as a gradual process initially using parliamentary elections and professional syndicates as conduits for leveraging political clout.

The exploitation of favorable POS's by social movements leads to regime hybridization. Bruce Rutherford argues that as a method for preserving legitimacy, an authoritarian regime is compelled to liberalize certain aspects of governance. Liberalization may lead to relative democratization, yielding one of many potential hybrid variants. In the Egyptian case, the regime's loss of authoritarian legitimacy was a direct result of broad social processes. These phenomena debilitated the regime's claim to over authoritarianism and prompted concessions to opposition groups. This trajectory ultimately provided a favorable POS and the emergence of PPM in Egypt. Effective analysis of these main texts will aid in my argument that the Muslim Brotherhood's exploitation of favorable environmental circumstances supplemented by strategic organizational decisions allowed for its emergence as a mainstream opposition entity.

Theoretical Framework

THE POLITICAL PROCESS MODEL, HYBRIDIZATION AND PPMH

Social movement theory literature is a sociological academic approach seeking to define and typify the elements that yield social and political change. The range of existent perspectives in this field takes into account socio-political circumstances while seeking to posit an overlying interpretation with the intent of forming a theoretical paradigm. I will explore the work of various scholars of social movement theory and emphasize fundamental components of the theoretical canon with the intention of explaining the historical trajectory of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

Doug McAdam's study of the American Civil Rights Movement is widely regarded as the most influential work of social movement theory. This text, entitled Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, dedicates the first three chapters grappling with several approaches to social movement theory. McAdam's initial focus is the "classical model of social movements." At a very basic level, the classical model contends that any type of structural strain within society leads to a disruptive psychological state among the populace. In an attempt to ameliorate this psychological dissonance, units of society promote social movement.

McAdam proposes an alternative to the classical model in his description of the "political process model" (PPM). The primary distinction between the two approaches is that the political process model considers social movements as primarily political in nature in contrast to the classical emphasis on psychological factors. Another area of inconsistency between the models is the realization that social movements are a continuous process rather than distinct phases constituting a greater phenomenon. McAdam attributes some elements of

his theory to Marxist ideology by claiming that the prospective success of a social insurgency is dependent on a group's "structural power" within the established social, political and economic environment. In quoting Schwartz, McAdam asserts that any threat to the power structure jeopardizes the system itself.^{vi}

The PPM asserts the importance of time as a necessity for successful social "insurgency." ("Insurgency," in this case, is distinct from the political theory known as counterinsurgency theory (COIN). Instead, an insurgency is a movement seeking to alter the political status quo. The term insurgency is interchangeable with "social movement.") By operating over the course of a long period of time, social movements tend to be less dramatic than those described in the classical model. Similarly, a significant window of time provides for more opportunity to organize and execute an insurgency while allowing the existing power structure to fluctuate in stability.

Shifts in political stability increase the efficacy of a social movement and reduce the power discrepancy between the insurgent groups and its opponents. The political capital of a regime tends to fluctuate over time. As the political status quo changes, opposition groups vie for power in place of a weakened establishment. A similar phenomenon emerges as broad social processes gain momentum. McAdam qualifies "broad social processes" as any long-term socioeconomic shift. These processes must disrupt the political environment in which the social movement operates. An important nuance to this concept is that a broad social process must emerge independent of insurgent groups.

Political legitimacy is another theoretical dimension of this paper. Hesham al-Awadi's book explores the concept of legitimacy in detail and applies it to the case of the Egyptian presidency. A classical interpretation of legitimacy stems from the scholarship of Max Weber

who contends that legitimacy exists in three primary forms: charismatic, traditional and rationally-based. Charismatic legitimacy refers to the personal qualities of a leader who receives immediate consent from the populace due to popular appeal. Traditional leadership exists through established channels of authority and adheres to structured archetypes of power. Rational leadership emerges as a type of authority “dependent on the acceptance of certain formal rules and procedures that were rationally valid and legally binding.”^{vii} A regime reliant on a specific type of legitimacy may, over time alter the basis of legitimacy. Al-Awadi provides the example of a ruler reliant on charismatic leadership who later adopts elements of rational legitimacy in order to ensure the survival of the regime.

Al-Awadi also discusses eudaemonic legitimacy in the context of Arab regimes. The concept of eudaemonic legitimacy, developed by Gehlen, is defined by “acts of rule that assist the economic system to produce an increasing flow of goods and services for the consumer.”^{viii} The emergent element distinguishing eudaemonic legitimacy from the Weberian paradigms is the role of the populace in assessing legitimacy. The populace maintains “popular expectations” which guide their perception of political performance. Leaders are accountable to these expectations, and must find some method for fulfilling them.

The eudaemonic legitimacy occurs primarily in welfare states. Al-Awadi discusses the various approaches to a “welfarist state:”

One definition of a welfare state is that it is one that aims to reduce the negative impact of social divisions and mitigate social inequalities. Another emphasizes the state’s responsibilities for securing a basic level of welfare for its citizens.^{ix} These variations on the welfare state both seek to improve the plight of its citizens. The state takes a patron role in improving the lives of its subjects and seeks to increase aggregate socio-economic stability.

Shifts in the political status quo provide social movements with political opportunity structures (POS) that may be exploited to attain legitimacy. A successful insurgency will exploit the favorable circumstances provided by instability or socioeconomic change as an opportunity to leverage its political position. A book by Banu Eligur on Islamist social movements in Turkey explores the nuanced relationship between an insurgency and its environment:

Social movement mobilization . . . depends on the existence of a POS, *and* the presence of movement entrepreneurs, *along with* the availability of organizational resources and grievances that can be created or exploited by movement activists.^x The underlying point of Eligur's statement is that a favorable POS is merely one element of a successful movement. Strong leadership within the movement must supplement shifts in regime stability and broad social processes. Effective leadership must seek to exploit the new political environment while effectively utilizing organizational resources, both tangible and intangible, in order to mobilize. As the insurgency successfully increases its political capital, it has minimized the power discrepancy existent between it and the establishment. McAdam considers an insurgency in this situation to have gained an "improved bargaining position." This terminology suggests that the insurgency is now more capable of asserting its agenda and pressuring the government to adhere to its demands.^{xi}

An improved bargaining position also raises the cost of repressing insurgent activity for the establishment. Prior to achieving an improved bargaining position, the establishment could punish insurgents with relative impunity. As a social movement garners greater political efficacy, the government can no longer resort to repression without cost. Thus, a shift in political conditions has the capacity to increase the power of insurgent groups while buffering them from repression. This may affect movement participation as risk of involvement has decreased due to the increased cost of repression. The populace may

perceive the regime as less capable of inflicting normative damage on an individual, and may feel freer to participate in opposition politics.

“Bloc recruitment” seeks to explain the means by which a movement gains participants. The idea contends that movement participation stems directly from “established lines of interaction,” where an individual is more easily recruited as an integrated member of a preexisting group with goals consistent with those of the insurgency.^{xii} This trend is applicable on an associational level where a participant in a group with loose associations with another group is likely to sympathize with the latter in addition to the former. Associational participation has often occurred in a group context, thus evoking the term “bloc recruitment.” Minority insurgent groups often merge, forming coalitions of like-minded activists. Highly organized groups have the capacity to influence its membership to join an oppositional coalition. Movements are, therefore, dependent on collectively motivated participation rather than the support of many individuals.

The recruitment of individuals beyond the initial bloc recruitment requires a widespread embrace of “system attributions.” As individuals within society suffer, they may blame their circumstances their own existence. Their despair exists on an individual level, and remains isolated to their own experiences. This type of behavior is less likely for a socially integrated individual. Contact with other socially integrated citizens provides the individual with a means for recognizing common disadvantages, or group plight. Suffering therefore emerges as a function of society rather than the fault of the individual in despair. Collectivity facilitates improved consciousness within society and can prove beneficial to the recruitment goals of an insurgency.

Movement participation is also determined by cost/risk assessment by the individual. Social movements emerge as “a product of the ongoing interaction of organized contenders within a shifting politico-economic environment.”^{xiii} The intricate structure of a social movement, therefore, demands specific costs and risks from movement participants. Cost refers to personal expenditures of time, money and energy. Risk refers to the “anticipated dangers” of movement participation.^{xiv} Individuals within society must make a personal cost/risk assessment prior to engaging in a social insurgency. Participation is more likely when personal rights and privileges are under threat.

Social movements operating in authoritarian settings are most likely to invoke the coercive powers of the regime. Carrie Rosefky Wickham identifies the characteristics of authoritarian rule with the following two elements:

- (1) Their leaders possess administrative, legislative, and coercive powers typically unavailable to leaders in democratic systems, and (2) they use such powers to retain control of the state apparatus regardless of how much support they have in the electorate.^{xv}

Authoritarian leaders are more likely than democratic ones to exercise coercive tools to mitigate opposition activism. This trend is primarily due to the nature of the existent political system, and the disproportionate power maintained by an authoritarian ruler. Authoritarian leaders are disinclined to respond to a constituency, and may exercise coercion in order to maintain power.

Coercion generally aims to contain the agents, sites and targets of mobilization. Tactics such as banning a group or arresting large numbers of its members seek to control the *agents* of activism. This strategy, as previously noted, may prove politically costly to the regime as the movement garners legitimacy and an improved bargaining position. A regime may decide in this context to control the *sites* of activism. Although the authoritarian leader tolerates a

certain level of opposition activism, it may limit the spread of the movement's message. The authoritarian regime may also attempt to appropriate the *targets* of mobilization. As the arbiters of coercion, the regime may co-opt the movement's support base. Such co-optation is a common element of eudaemonic legitimacy, where "buying" the support base takes place through distribution of scarce resources.^{xvi}

Insurgencies with goals of reform rather than revolution are more likely to encounter a divided elite. A movement with a reform agenda is more benign to the elite. Insurgencies aiming to reform specific aspects of society will clash only with groups whose "interests are directly affected by the proposed changes."^{xvii} Moderate reform may also motivate relative support from other segments of the elite. These movements are exceedingly successful when exploiting the divisions that occur among the elite with regards to moderate social reform.

A second strategy for garnering elite support is the use of institutionalized tactics. Insurgent groups who expect any degree of elite support must also rely on established channels of political expression. The elite will feel less threatened by a social insurgency competing by established means since the elite will consider previous system experience as an advantage.

The concept of regime liberalization emerges in the scholarship of Bruce K. Rutherford in his concept of "hybridization." Hybrid regimes are frequently the product of change in three distinct arenas: "elite calculations for survival," "change in the relative power of institutions within the state and society" and "erosion of the political ideas that legitimate the regime." The first motivation for hybridization stems from a regime's internal considerations for maintaining power. A period of crisis, whether economic or otherwise, prompts regime insecurity. The sources of legitimacy are fundamentally weakened, and the government must

respond accordingly in order to secure its future. Reforms in response to such crisis may include regime liberalization with regard to opposition.


The second circumstance that prompts hybridization relates to eudemonic legitimacy and the development of a welfare state. A period of economic insecurity weakens the regime's capacity to maintain the welfare state. In response, the regime may liberalize and allow for the emergence of new economic institutions intending to improve the regime's economic performance. The regime may also liberalize by allowing external organizations to provide the faltering welfare services. This scenario requires both the weakening of autocratic institutions and the expansion of alternative, non-governmental organizations.

The final phenomenon relating to hybridization is the dissolution of the regime's ideals. Authoritarian regimes are commonly reliant on specific ideals upon which legitimacy is founded. Crises such as economic insecurity or military defeat have the capacity to strip these ideologies of their legitimacy. Thus, regimes are unable to justify the consolidation of power by way of these ideologies. The absence of a dominant ideology creates a vacuum in which new concepts may emerge and challenge the preexisting rationale for authoritarianism. Regimes must adapt in such a situation, and often choose to do so by hybridization.

In consideration of both PPM and hybridization, I have formulated a theoretical approach known as the "political process model of hybridization" (PPMH). As an authoritarian regime encounters broad social processes it is forced to liberalize. Liberalization yields a favorable POS that can be exploited by a social insurgency. Social insurgencies are only able to effectively exploit this favorable POS if supported by strong organizational leadership. The amount by which an authoritarian regime liberalizes is incumbent on two factors: internal decisions by the political elite, and the relative power discrepancy between the regime and its

opposition. In the Egyptian case, liberalization led to the emergence of a “hegemonic party system” under which “free elections occur, but one party thoroughly dominates the electoral process and precludes any meaningful competition for power.”^{xviii} Once a hybrid regime is established, the elite may not revert to strict authoritarianism. Extreme coercion or blatant disregard for established democratic functions will strip the regime entirely of its legitimacy, and may lead to regime deposition.

PPMH serves to explain the case of the Egyptian regime. Gradual liberalization reached its apex during the parliamentary elections of 2005. Due to its political efficacy, the Muslim Brotherhood formed the largest opposition force in the history of the People’s Assembly. The failure of the Muslim Brotherhood in the subsequent parliamentary elections of 2010 was not due to organizational mistakes, but rather blatant electoral fraud executed by Mubarak’s regime. The Egyptian people did not accept such disregard for the democratic processes established by the precedent of the previous election. The result was widespread civil unrest: the result of system attribution and a threat to aggregate democratic rights. Mubarak’s authoritarian reversion prompted movement participation beyond the Muslim Brotherhood’s bloc recruitment. As a result, Mubarak suffered a major loss of legitimacy that ultimately deposed his regime.



THE SUBSEQUENT CHAPTERS

The subsequent chapters will apply the political process model of social movement theory to the historical trajectory of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. In tracing the organization's behavior in the context of social, political and economic factors, I will argue that the Muslim Brotherhood is an appropriate case study of the political process model. Although initially repressed under Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Brotherhood exploited a favorable POS following the 1967 military defeat by Israel. The regime provided concessions to opposition activism by allowing for Islamist organization on university campuses. This relative tolerance of agents and sites of opposition activism continued during the presidency of Anwar El Sadat. The Brotherhood exploited this favorable POS in order to participate in Egyptian politics by institutionalized means. The Brotherhood also benefited from their

moderate Islamist agenda in contrast to groups such as Islamic Jihad. As a result of this approach, the Brotherhood enjoyed a degree of toleration by the regime.

The PPM explains the development of a social insurgency in the wake of a favorable POS while Rutherford's theory of hybridization does so from the perspective of the establishment. The relative liberalization of regime policies between 1967 and 1981 represented the initial phases of regime hybridization. I will argue that the favorable POS improved the Brotherhood's bargaining position and increased the cost of repression for the regime. This process of liberalization was not overly extensive; Sadat's repressive policies indicated his desire to maintain some aspects of authoritarianism. Mubarak's policies were reminiscent of Sadat's by initially providing concessions to the Brotherhood and later revoking certain liberties. The hybrid element of the Free Officers' regime is most accurately characterized as a hegemonic party system. Despite the occurrence of regular elections, the National Democratic Party controlled the outcomes and regulated participants.

The final aspect of my theoretical analysis will explore the nature of each ruler's legitimacy as well as that of the Brotherhood. Although the Weberian paradigms of legitimacy are certainly applicable in each case, I will also incorporate the idea of eudaemonic legitimacy to explain the maintenance and eventual loss of legitimacy by the regime. Eudaemonic legitimacy is also relevant to the Muslim Brotherhood. While the Nasserist welfare state failed, the Brotherhood exploited the favorable POS due to its strong organizational capacity. As a result, the Brotherhood achieved a high level of electoral success while benefiting from bloc recruitment.

Through the application of the theoretical elements described in the preceding pages, I will rationalize the progression of the Muslim Brotherhood from the political periphery to its

emergence in the Egyptian political mainstream. This progression is the result of interplay between organizational decisions within the Brotherhood, the shifting political contexts of its protracted insurgency and the varying policies of containment employed by the regimes of the latter half of the 20th century. This paper will conclude with a discussion of the current situation in Egypt following Mubarak's ouster, indicating the case's consistency with the PPMH.

The Early Years (1928-1952)

Sheikh Hassan al-Banna formed the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 in response to the increasing influence of the West on Egyptian and Islamic society. The organization maintains that contemporary Egyptian society is plagued by decadence and depravity caused by foreign conquerors and the ubiquity of Western values. Banna and his followers sought to restore Islamic principles within Egyptian society. Islam represents the apex of societal doctrines, positing the gamut of Western “isms” as inferior. According to Banna, Islam governs social and personal conduct in addition to codifying an ethical legal system. The behavioral expectations are described through Islamic revelation (i.e. the Qur’an and hadith literature), which serves as a basis for the formulation of an acceptable Islamic society. The Brotherhood’s objective of establishing Islam as the essential source for Egyptian social and political policy provides for its definition as an insurgency.

The Muslim Brotherhood sought to alter the Egyptian political system as a means for fostering a socio-political order consistent with the Islamic ideal. The growing adherence to Western values and philosophies by the Egyptian regimes allowed Banna a context for the articulation of his discontent. The Brotherhood, comprised of pious Muslims, urged the necessity to restructure the modern Egyptian state based on a divine source rather than a structure derived by human reason. This goal is defined in an English translation of the Brotherhood’s constitution. Article 2, Part E of the constitution states the following as a primary organizational objective: “to assist in the constitution of a government to rule according to Islamic laws and principles.”^{xix} The Brotherhood’s desire to alter Egyptian politics is so profound that the idea emerges as one of six primary organizational objectives. In this document, the Brotherhood assumes the role of active political reformer. The use of

the word “assist,” indicates the Brotherhood’s concept of itself as part of a greater society rather than a monolithic reformer. An Islamic state is impossible to attain without the cooperation of all Egyptians. For this reason, the Brotherhood devotes the remaining five objectives of its constitution to social goals. Among these are facilitation of religious education, improvement of standards of living, development of charity works, liberation of Islamic nations and contribution towards world peace.

Although the translation was published 22 years after the original drafting of the document, American Ambassador to Egypt Jefferson Caffery asserts in his foreword “It is understood that no changes have ever been made in the original Constitution and that it is still in force.” He provides further insight, stating that “political and economic aims were already included among the objectives” in the Brotherhood’s nascent stages.^{xx} Caffery’s observation indicates the socio-political nature of the Brotherhood’s aims from its inception. The organization sought to institute comprehensive changes to the existing system, and assumed this motive as inherent to its structure. As a result, the Brotherhood emerged in the Egyptian political system as an extra-parliamentary opposition force existing outside of the auspices of the established electoral system.^{xxi} Rather than garnering support for political candidates, the Brotherhood represented an ideological cause. Chapter 2, Article 3 of the Brotherhood’s constitution enumerates the four methods by which it seeks to attain its six organizational objectives. These strategic means include “propaganda,” which aims to spread the message of the organization, “education,” which promotes a uniform understanding of the organization and its Islamic principles, “direction,” which includes the creation of programs suitable to the organizational aims and “activities,” which promotes a system of social welfare based in Islam. Each of these four methods seeks to engender an organization

dependent on the public for support. The emphasis on charity and welfare indicates the Brotherhood's intent to aid impoverished Egyptians.

The Muslim Brotherhood exercises its comprehensive social strategy to garner support and mobilize the populace. Banna's ideological motivation for aiding impoverished Egyptians coincided with the constitutional aims of the Brotherhood: to serve as a buffer of opposition between the Western controlled economy and the working classes.^{xxii} Early political organizing by the Brotherhood focused on establishing labor unions among various industries including textiles. Prior to the pseudo-socialist policies of Gamal Abdel Nasser after his Free Officer's Revolt of 1952, the Egyptian economy was heavily reliant on agriculture, and most specifically on textile crops such as cotton. Dependence on cotton turned Egypt into a one-crop exporter of long-staple cotton, with the industry dominated by a small European minority. The nature of the industry left Egypt entirely dependent on cotton export and the workers vulnerable to the will of the landowners who controlled a disproportionate portion of arable land. Agriculture comprised the majority of the national income, and served as a source of employment for nearly two thirds of the labor force.^{xxiii} By organizing the textile laborers, the Muslim Brotherhood gained the confidence of a significant portion of the populace. The unions, therefore, became a conduit for the Brotherhood to realize its political goals. Labor strikes were effective means for the Brotherhood to marginalize the leadership of the Wafdist regime and establish superiority in the arena of labor prior to 1952.^{xxiv}

The Brotherhood was also committed to providing an array of social services to the general populace outside of the unions. In observance of both "education" and "observance," two strategic means for achieving constitutional objectives, the Muslim Brotherhood

developed schools and hospitals.^{xxv} These civil projects intended to serve the urban working class living in squalid conditions unmitigated by the existing regime. A rising demand for manufactured products prompted many rural Egyptians to migrate to urban areas seeking work in factories. This trend became especially prominent during World War II as British capitalists created factories for munitions production. The increasing demand for low-skilled factory labor drove down wages and contributed to the poverty and malnutrition, which plagued the workforce. As the war subsided, many of these workers were dismissed and left unemployed, exacerbating their economic woes and engendering disillusionment. The floundering Egyptian economy represented a favorable POS for the Muslim Brotherhood to exploit. The unemployed sector proved the ideal target for the Muslim Brotherhood who courted them with civil projects intending to improve their plight. As a result of these directed campaigns, the Brotherhood facilitated bloc recruitment; membership grew to a speculated half a million.^{xxvi}

The 1950 election prompted the Wafd party to court the Muslim Brotherhood for electoral support. Facing off against the powerful Saadist incumbent, the Wafd desperately needed a guaranteed bloc of support in order to compete. The Wafd, therefore, approached the banned Muslim Brotherhood as a solution to electoral insecurity. By promising the Brotherhood renewed legality upon its election, the Wafd garnered support from the powerful organization. This relationship, however, was not inherent to the doctrines of the two parties, and instead indicated self-interested motivations for both. In reality, the Wafd and the Brotherhood were at doctrinal odds. A statement by a Brotherhood spokesman was accurate in stating that the Wafd and the Brotherhood drew support from the same popular classes. An interview with Brotherhood vice-president Saleh Ashmawi supported this claim,

indicating that the Wafd “is the only party in Egypt which has large popular support.” He continues with his statement to define the competition that stems from the sharing of popular support: “it is inevitable that we be competitors. However, as long as . . . the Wafdists are ruling the country as true Egyptian patriots, they will have our approval.”^{xxvii} Vice-president Ashmawi acknowledged the competing interests that exist between the Wafd and the Brotherhood, yet he remained in support of the Wafd as protectors of Egypt’s national interests. The ideological divide between the two organizations made Ashmawi’s statements an obscure articulation of the Brotherhood’s constitutional objectives. Aly el-Ghayatt, the Minister of Foreign Affairs under the newly elected Wafd regime, clearly defines the nature of the doctrinal dissonance: “I am fully in favor of separation of State and Religion. Therefore, I am opposed to the views of the Moslem Brothers.”^{xxviii} As articulated in the organization’s constitution, the Muslim Brotherhood seeks to implement a government adherent to Islamic laws and principles. An official statement by a Wafd bureaucrat denouncing the Islamist goals of the Brotherhood places the two parties at ideological odds. Despite this fundamental conflict of ideas between the two parties, both groups cooperated during the 1950 election in order to attain self-interested goals.

The Brotherhood’s support of the Wafd was also motivated by its quest for revenge against the Saadists.^{xxix} This party represented the established Egyptian regime for decades, and was responsible for the unilateral ban on the Brotherhood. The Saadists were also the political competition of the Wafd, as both parties were vying for control of the government. In contrast to the Wafdists, the Saadists had no intention of allowing the Brotherhood to “reorganize or reappear in any new guise.”^{xxx} The position of the Saadists with regards to the Brotherhood reinforced the decision to support the Wafd in the 1950 election. This support

proved crucial in the Wafd's victory during the election.^{xxxii} Thus, the Brotherhood emerged as a shrewd political operator by mobilizing its support base to achieve substantive goals within the electoral system.

Although the Brotherhood's political calculations proved non-violent, the Brotherhood relied on militancy during this era. The "Special Organization" emerged in the late 1930's under the supervision of Hassan al-Banna who sought to include "violence if necessary" to realize organizational goals.^{xxxiii} Banna's vision for the military apparatus proved reminiscent of a personal security force that answered directly to him as the "General Guide," or the top leader of the Brotherhood. The Special Organization consisted of various subdivisions including suicide fighters and reconnaissance personnel. Members of the reconnaissance division were generally students who later completed military training under the supervision of Egyptian military officers. The military division of the Brotherhood burgeoned during World War II, and consisted of 45,000 members by the war's end.^{xxxiiii}

The clandestine political violence characteristic of the Muslim Brotherhood emerged in the public consciousness after the trial pertaining to the "Jeep Case" of 1948. The growth of the Brotherhood's military establishment throughout the 1940's yielded a rise in violent plots during that time. On December 10, 1946, several Brothers were arrested on charges of bomb manufacturing. This event, in conjunction with many other high profile arrests, indicated the Brotherhood's intention to "embark on widespread terroristic activity of pressing danger to the security and existence of the state."^{xxxv}

The violent trend that characterized this era culminated in the government's apprehending of a jeep belonging to the leadership of the Secret Organization. This seizure led to the arrest of some of the most prominent military leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood

as well as the confiscation of an “arsenal.” By exposing the militaristic component of the Brotherhood, the Egyptian government concluded on the organization’s responsibility for “a series of terrorist outrages perpetrated in Egypt.”^{xxxv}

The Brotherhood’s ability to maneuver within the political system along with its militaristic tendencies prompted its participation in the Free Officer’s Revolt of 1952. The 1948 “Jeep Case,” which led to the arrests of many leaders within the Special Organization, indicated a connection between the Brotherhood and the Egyptian military. Many of the munitions seized in the “Jeep Case” were intended as reinforcements for Brotherhood members within the Egyptian military. The relationship between the two groups has its roots in the early 1940’s with ‘Abd al-Mun’im ‘Abd al-Ra’uf who served as a liaison between the officers of the Egyptian army and the Muslim Brotherhood. ‘Abd al-Ra’uf filled some of the most prestigious positions within the Brotherhood, and was also an active member of the Free Officers. Along with Mahmud Labib, ‘Abd al-Rauf recruited members of the established military on behalf of the Brotherhood. Labib himself led a volunteer division of the Egyptian army in Palestine, a company comprised primarily of Muslim Brothers. ‘Abd al-Rauf and Labib continued their recruitment throughout World War II, providing for a deep interdependence between the two groups. The relationship grew to the point where the king allegedly received a report stating that 33 per cent of officers in the Egyptian army were “bound to the Muslim Brothers.”^{xxxvi}

The relationship between the Brotherhood and the Free Officers prompted cooperation during the revolt. Despite Mitchell’s claim that “most Egyptians supported the revolution,” not many of those supporters chose to assist in its execution.^{xxxvii} The following encompasses

Mitchell's description of the role of the Brotherhood in carrying out the Free Officer's

Revolt:

First, the members of the Society were to take upon themselves the protection of foreigners and foreign establishments (including places of business and diplomacy), of minorities (homes, churches, and synagogues), and of strategic centres of communications in the city Along with this, the Society would establish a network of intelligence over the movements of 'suspicious' and 'potentially treasonous' Egyptians. Secondly, should immediate popular enthusiasm for the army movement be lacking, the Society would fill the streets to spark it off and ensure immediate popular acceptance of the coup. Thirdly, if the police failed to co-operate with the army, the Society would dispatch its rovers to join in whatever fighting ensued and to assist in the maintenance of order and security. Fourthly, if the movement, despite all precautions, failed, the Muslim Brothers would assist in the protection and escape of the Free Officers.^{xxxviii}

According to this report, the Brotherhood essentially served as an insurance provider for the audacious young officers. The strong organizational structure of the Brotherhood indicated it as the most viable candidate for mobilizing support for the coup. Although the Brotherhood did not carry out the junta directly, its services rendered provided additional security and confidence for the Free Officers.

Assuming this account is factual, the Brotherhood has clearly embodied the component of political process theory known as bloc recruitment. As previously described, like-minded insurgent groups will often prove sympathetic to one another. Both the Brotherhood and the Free Officers represent blocs of mobilized insurgents rather than conglomerations of individual activists. Although the Brotherhood was not the primary purveyor of the social movement initiated in 1952, they represented a willing partner for the Free Officers. The Free Officers, while inherently secular, maintained strong connections with the Brotherhood. The two groups shared the sentiment of discontent with regards to the British occupation of Egypt, each hoping to limit Western influence. The overlap between the two organizations was a source of solidarity and facilitated opposition participation. The nature by which

members of the Brotherhood assisted the Free Officers in subverting the establishment is indicative of bloc recruitment. Both groups existed as highly organized oppositional entities with relatively congruent immediate goals. The Brotherhood mobilized its membership to assist in the revolt through “established lines of interaction” existing largely due to the efforts of Mahmud Labib and ‘Abd al-Mun’im ‘Abd al-Rauf.

Although the Free Officers Revolt represented the beginning of a social movement process, it clearly embodies certain elements of McAdam’s political process theory. As I continue to describe the socio-political developments of 20th century Egypt, I will provide further accounts of the relevance of this theory. The emergence of Nasser as an influential leader and nationalist figure relates to Al-Awadi’s description of charismatic legitimacy, which later manifests itself in a more eudaemonic paradigm. Similarly, the shifts in political status quo provided for a favorable POS exploited by the Muslim Brotherhood in order to exercise established means of opposition.

The Nasser Years (1952-1970)

The presidency of Gamel Abdel Nasser yielded a series of significant changes that shifted the political status quo. As the figurehead of Arab nationalism, Nasser's charismatic approach to leadership invigorated his people. His attempt to rejuvenate Egyptian society through industrialization prompted greater urban migration, altering the demographic landscape of the country. The 1967 war proved another major event prompting a change in the political status quo. The humiliating defeat of Nasser's army by Israel injured the legitimacy of his regime. Despite the volatile nature of Nasser's reign, his preemptive capacity of suppressing opposition provided for his maintenance of order and preserved his legitimacy until his death.

Nasser rose to power two years after the revolution, and immediately began exercising an authoritarian-populist regime. Authoritarian-populism regimes tend to seek reform at a fundamental level. Reform occurs incrementally and entails the reconciliation of competing interests through populist doctrine and the redistribution of capital. Nasser was particularly effective at assuaging popular dissent through various means. One major contributing factor to Nasser's success as a leader was his inherent charisma. His oratory skills allowed him to capture the hearts and minds of a people who considered him a liberator from Western hegemony. Another more prominent element of Nasser's success was his ability to stifle opposition. Within the first year of Nasser's assumption of power, he had banned the Muslim Brotherhood from organizing despite their influential role in aiding his revolution two years prior.^{xxxix} Nasser also imposed state control on the sites of mobilization and banned opposition organization in schools and universities.^{xl} This strategy enabled his regime to limit the agents of opposition from reaching their targets.

Nasser's relationship with his populace was maintained by what scholars have deemed a "social contract." Based on the theory of eudaemonic legitimacy, Nasser was expected by the Egyptian people to develop a reliable welfare state. Hisham al-Awadi describes the nuances of Nasser's role as the Egyptian president:

He was expected to supplant charisma and populism with a basis of eudaemonic legitimacy, through which he had also to project his period of tenure as one that would institute a solid welfare system for Egyptian people and confirm the state's responsibility for providing subsidized food, free education, and health services as well as employment for new graduates. This was the price paid by Nasser in return for the consent of the rising middle-classes, and the social contract that he instituted in exchange for their political acquiescence.^{xli}

As a method of maintaining legitimacy, Nasser instituted broad social reform, including a revamped welfare state. The expanded government services were a means for securing the support of the growing middle class, a product of Nasser's "appointment policy" (I will discuss this phenomenon in depth later in the chapter). The emergent middle class was also the recruitment target of many opposition groups. In securing the support of the middle class, Nasser effectively co-opted opposition membership. He also engendered a sense of obligation to the patron-state among the middle class, prompting an adherence to the social contract.

Nasser's ability to cultivate eudaemonic legitimacy stemmed from his inherent charismatic legitimacy. The momentum of the Free Officer's Revolt invigorated the Egyptian populace. Although Muhammad Neguib initially served as president from 1952 until 1954, the clear figurehead of the revolution was the young and energetic Gamel Abdel Nasser. His ascent to power in 1954 was widely embraced by the Egyptian populace, primarily due to his popular appeal. Although Nasser was an inexperienced politician, Weberian ideas of legitimacy contend that the leader benefited from his charisma. Weber elaborates on the nature of charismatic leadership:

The holder of charisma seizes the task that is adequate for him and demands obedience and a following by virtue of his mission His charismatic claim breaks down if his mission is not recognized by those whom he feels he has been sent. If they recognize him, he is their master- so long as he knows how to maintain recognition through ‘proving’ himself it is the *duty* of those to whom he addresses his mission to recognize him as their charismatically qualified leader.^{xlii}

A leader who depends on charisma as a source for legitimacy stakes an inherent claim to the loyalties of the people. Such a claim is incumbent on the viability of the leader’s cause. If the populace is unwilling to embrace the cause espoused by that leader, then there is no legitimacy to forge. In contrast, if the leader successfully markets a cause to the populace, he/she has harnessed an authoritarian type of power. The populace looks to that individual with reverence, as a crusader for a noble cause.

Weber recognizes that while charisma may allow a leader to assume a position of power, legitimacy is ephemeral and must be reaffirmed. As specified by Weber, charismatic legitimacy often stems from the populace’s embrace of a specific cause or ideal. As the face of a revolution, Nasser championed several ideas including the expulsion of the British as well as unilateral opposition to Israel.^{xliii} Using the rhetoric of pan-Arabism, Nasser criticized the West for its hegemony and established a sense of solidarity within a region fractured by de-facto colonialism. The rhetoric alone was insufficient for long-term maintenance of popular legitimacy, and prompted Nasser’s embrace of eudaemonic legitimacy. According to Al-Awadi, “charisma and political rhetoric concerning attitudes to Israel and the West were not sufficient to maintain a stable regime.”^{xliv} Nasser was forced to adjust his basis for legitimacy after a certain period of time, leading to his embrace of an enhanced welfare state. Through the expansion of education and his “appointment policy,” Nasser effectively transitioned from a purely charismatic form of legitimacy to one eudaemonic in nature.

Nasser's eudaemonic social contract drew the support of targets of opposition by offering education and employment opportunities. At the time of the 1952 revolution, Egypt's economy favored foreign investment to indigenous entrepreneurship. Although the nation had technically gained independence from the British in 1917, the dominance of a single staple crop propagated by European landowners yielded severe economic disparity among the ruling gentry and the working class.^{xlv} The Egyptian education system reinforced the social makeup providing clear advantages to the established educated gentry. Nasser's national ambitions for expanding industry and agriculture prompting a growing need for an educated workforce. The Egyptian government after Nasser's ascent to power in 1954 began promoting higher education reform and bolstered financial allocation to universities by a significant margin. This approach was motivated not only by Nasser's ambitions to catalyze state-led economic growth, but also in order to "eliminate class privilege by providing new opportunities for meritocratic advancement."^{xlvi}

In conjunction with expanding public access to higher education, Nasser's regime guaranteed government employment to any university graduate. A statement by Kamal ed-Din Hussein, a minister of education under Nasser, specifies that by 1964, the government guaranteed employment to all university, two-year technical institute and secondary school graduates as "part of the socialist thinking." An enhanced welfare state provided Egypt's non-elite with improved social mobility. Nasser's solution for unemployment came to be known as the "appointment policy," which ultimately led to the state workforce consisting of roughly 60 percent of university graduates by 1969.^{xlvii}

The appointment policy eventually indicated itself as a financially unsustainable program. Nasser's prerogative for employing such vast numbers of Egypt's workforce

provided for the emergence of a low-salaried, white collar class of bureaucrats known as the “lumpen salariat.” This group sought to maintain a particular lifestyle indicative of its social mobility. Nasser’s policy, however, imposed significant financial strain on the Egyptian welfare state. As the Egyptian economy began to falter following the nation’s defeat in the 1967 war against Israel, the earning power of this unskilled class of bureaucrats also declined.^{xlviii} Despite the financial reality, Nasser maintained the appointment policy at the further expense of the Egyptian economy. The ultimate result of this steadfast adherence to a welfare policy “transferred income to the educated at the cost of future economic growth, ultimately eroding the state’s resource base for future distribution.”^{xlix} This statement is reinforced by empirical figures, which reflect the regime’s focus on public investment: by 1965, public investment constituted 95 percent of gross domestic fixed investment. Similarly, public-sector employment grew by approximately 73 percent between 1960 and 1970.¹

Nasser’s overt emphasis on training engineering and agricultural professionals led to a surplus of graduates in those industries. A primary objective of the socialist style education reform was to prompt growth in the Egyptian economy through increased industrial output and improved technological advancement. Engineers and agriculture specialists emerged as some of the most highly emphasized vocational tracks as a result. The quantities by which the revamped education system produced such professionals were not solely driven by labor demands. This became exceedingly apparent by the 1970’s when Egypt produced nearly twice as many engineers as the labor market required.^{li} Nasser sought to create opportunities for meritocratic advancement and improve social mobility in Egypt. Additionally, Nasser’s education reforms intended to secure the support of the Egyptian populace. Education was a

fundamental element of Nasser's maintenance of eudaemonic legitimacy and the establishment of his social contract.

Prior to 1952, higher education in Egypt was inaccessible to the working classes. Universities were a privilege reserved primarily for the children of government officials, foreign subjects and other members of the elite. Those fortunate enough to obtain university degrees were eligible to serve in the civil service sector. As previously mentioned, Europeans dominated the Egyptian economy and industry, leaving minimal opportunities for indigenous entrepreneurship.^{lii} Civil service employment emerged as a highly esteemed career for an Egyptian, yet remained available only to those with formal education credentials. Salaries for these positions were often determined by the prestige associated with a degree. Therefore, those who attended prestigious academic institutions received the highest salaries further perpetuating the socio-economic disparity among Egyptians.

Nasser's education reform policies were very popular among the working classes as it provided for their social advancement. Although he truly sought to improve the plight of Egypt's poorest classes, Nasser was primarily concerned with ensuring the favor of Egypt's youth. Carrie Rosefsky Wickham describes the extent to which Nasser reformed the education system:

Having reduced tuition fees in 1956 and 1961, the government abolished all but nominal fees in 1962, making university education virtually free. Moreover, according to one estimate, nearly 75 percent of dormitory residents were exempted from pay any room charges, and students were given special privileges, including expensive transport, entertainment, and, most important, an exemption from military service.^{liii}

Nasser's commitment to satisfying the student population stemmed from his desire to co-opt them as potential targets or agents of opposition activism. In conjunction with the appointment policy, these graduates were afforded the opportunity to obtain white-collar civil

service employment, a privilege previously available only to the elite classes. Thus, there existed a distinct association between higher education and government employment.

The economic reforms of Nasser's presidency were extremely effective and aided in his maintenance of eudaemonic legitimacy. In congruence with the imposition of state power on most national institutions, Nasser dominated Egypt's industrial production. The appointment policy, providing over half of the population with government employment, placed the majority of the workforce under state control. Nasser's regime maintained executive power over Egyptian industrial production, often determining the primary foci of industrial advancement by arbitrary means. The nature of Nasser's statist leadership allowed the state to offer essential goods to the populace at affordable prices.^{liv} Increased access to essential goods improved the aggregate quality of life among Egyptians and bolstered the eudaemonic relationship between the populace and the regime.

The government's co-optation of opposition targets was supplemented by Nasser's reliance on coercion to suppress opposition groups. The authoritarian-populism of the Nasser era included the expansion of state control in most aspects of the Egyptian quotidian. The government justified its extension of influence through the aforementioned concept of the social contract. Ultimately, government control extended to political organizations, trade unions, voluntary associations, university campuses and social movements. These groups were required to recognize the legitimacy of the state and acquiesce to its established apparatuses by adhering to institutionalized channels of activism.^{lv}

In cases of defiance to state authority, Nasser exercised the coercive powers of the state. Such a situation arose with the Muslim Brotherhood within two years of the revolution. A major role player in the revolution itself, the Brotherhood expected an elevated role in state

affairs. As Nasser's regime consolidated power, the Muslim Brotherhood felt increasingly alienated from government operations and the functioning of a secular state. Discontent among the Brothers segued to public criticism of the regime's "policies with regard to the British and to the role of religion in Egyptian society and politics." By March of 1954, the Brotherhood was outlawed and disbanded with all of its assets confiscated by the state.^{lvi} That same year, student demonstrations and strikes led to mass arrests of Brotherhood leadership. The growing discontent with state leadership compounded by the unilateral ban on Brotherhood activities culminated in October of 1954. Midway through the month, Nasser made a tentative withdrawal agreement with the British who were entitled to maintain troops in Egypt for an additional six years. A faction of the Brotherhood failed in an attempted assassination of Nasser in late October, an event that prompted extreme coercive measures. In addition to arresting President Muhammad Neguib on the basis of cooperation with the Brotherhood, Nasser ordered the arrest of over 30,000 Muslim Brothers. Several high profile leaders of the organization were executed.^{lvii}

Nasser's control of the Egyptian legislature provided for his unchecked political maneuvering. Not one of the four assemblies that existed under Nasser was capable of executing a political agenda beyond the will of the regime.^{lviii} Nasser served as the chair of the National Union Executive Committee, a group charged with the task of approving parliamentary candidates. The primary rationale behind the establishment of this committee was to ensure that neither members of the Brotherhood nor Brotherhood sympathizers entered the *majlis al-sha'b*, or the People's Assembly. The assembly simply emerged as a tool for the regime to reaffirm its policies and exercise greater control over state political activities.

Consolidation of state power included student organizations on university campuses. The Muslim Brotherhood has been historically active with student groups especially at the university level. Nasser was fully aware of this tradition due to his experiences as Minister of the Interior between 1952 and 1954. During this time, Nasser observed that the Brotherhood used university campuses for the purposes of military training.^{lix} This prompted Nasser to impose security checks on students entering campuses, limiting their ability to carry out acts of violence in opposition to the state. Additionally, the passage of a 1953 law allowed the Minister of Education to fire university professors suspected of cooperation with the Brotherhood.

The legitimacy of Nasser's authoritarian-populism was viable in the short run, but began faltering by 1967. The economic growth and improved standard of living provided by the newly established welfare state was an expensive enterprise. As previously stated, much of the economic growth was due to high levels of public investment. This system ultimately eroded the state's capacity for further welfare initiatives. On a fundamental level, there was not enough state capital to sustain the subsidized elements of the welfare state while seeking vast economic growth. Thus, as economic growth began to wane, Nasser relied more thoroughly on the eudaemonic legitimacy reinforced by his welfarist policies. By maintaining these vast bureaucratic initiatives, Nasser effectively drained Egypt of its investment capabilities.^{lx} A growing population provided additional strain to the welfare state by increasing demand for services and subsidies.

After a humiliating defeat by Israel in the 1967 war, Nasser faced a crisis of legitimacy, forcing him to relax his reliance on coercion. According to Al-Awadi, the period following the 1967 war was characterized by Nasser's enhanced responsiveness to democratic reform

and the rule of law. A speech in March of 1968 enumerated various reforms dealing with the freedom of press, fair elections and the removal of security apparatuses from campuses. This effort has been considered by scholars as “an attempt to displace charismatic and revolutionary legitimacy with a more rational form.”^{lxvi} Nasser’s political calculations suggest a deviation from the authoritarian model, and represent the initial phase of PPM. The military defeat may be considered a broad social process that yielded a favorable POS.

Political reforms were accompanied by economic reforms. The defeat of 1967 thoroughly weakened the Egyptian military, requiring vast amounts of capital to revitalize its equipment and infrastructure. Increased military investment further eroded public funds. The nature of the war, along with Egypt’s alignment with the Soviet bloc, placed Egypt at odds with the prevailing Western powers. As a result, Egypt was ineligible to receive economic assistance in its recovery.^{lxvii} Without sufficient capital to prompt economic growth, Nasser was forced to liberalize restrictions on private capital investment in order to provide for alternative sources of income beyond the state.^{lxviii} This element of Nasser’s liberalization is consistent with the second aspect of hybridization described by Rutherford. In an effort to improve economic performance, an authoritarian regime will provide new avenues for market growth. Economic liberalization may also be characterized as a broad social process, and an indicator of a favorable POS.

Nasser also liberalized his attitude toward opposition activism following the 1967 war. The languid Egyptian economy weakened Nasser’s claim to the social contract. As a result, his demands of political quiescence from welfare benefactors were relatively impotent. The breakdown of eudaemonic legitimacy was exacerbated by Nasser’s continuation of extreme coercion by maintaining state control over agents, sites and targets of opposition. The weak

economy limited the earning power of the “lumpen salariat” which prompted a “politics of withdrawal.” This phenomenon is characterized by a “retreat into passivity and noninvolvement in public affairs.”^{lxiv} The reserved nature of the disillusioned Egyptians segued into popular unrest following the military defeat in 1967. Protest and opposition activism became increasingly more prominent, and Nasser adjusted his policies accordingly. The disillusioned “lumpen salariat” may be considered a potential target for bloc recruitment. Large-scale mobilization of this group did not occur, however, until the early years of Mubarak’s presidency.

A series of policy changes were directed at the epicenter of civil unrest: the universities. Although state-employed industrial workers prompted opposition activism, university students represented its lifeline. February 1968 was the first mass uprising by student groups since Nasser’s ascent to power in 1954.^{lxv} The momentum of this popular unrest was bolstered by Nasser’s limiting the presence of his security apparatus on campuses, the allowance of new student publications and a liberalized approach to allowing student activities. Students now enjoyed expanded avenues for political expression providing for more opposition activism. Nasser’s relative tolerance of opposition activism led to an emergent POS that later provided the Brotherhood with a foundation for carrying out its social insurgency.

Nasser’s courtship of student activism was accompanied by a renewed approach to religious activism. In an appeal to his religious supporters, Nasser began releasing political prisoners. By the time Anwar El-Sadat assumed power following Nasser’s death, only 140 members of the Muslim Brotherhood remained in Egyptian prisons.^{lxvi} The mass release of Islamist opposition activists was also motivated by international pressure by other Muslim

countries following the execution of a prominent leader of the Brotherhood in 1966. With a revitalized membership base, the Brotherhood was able to begin reforming its organizational structures on university campuses and in mosques. These political maneuvers reflect the primary motivation for hybridization: maintenance of power. Nasser understood the political cost of overt coercion, and instead yielded to the Islamists' improved bargaining position.

Although Nasser's co-optation of the opposition was successful in stifling social insurgency, his supporters became his most vocal critics after the 1967 war. An underlying motive for the expansion of the welfare state during Nasser's tenure was to win the support of those potentially sympathetic to regime opposition. Those who comprised the emergent white-collar middle class of bureaucrats were largely the recipients of government education and were subsequently employed by Nasser's appointment policy. These individuals were subjected to a certain level of indoctrination by a regime seeking to instill socialist values as an element of a revamped education system. The Egyptian student public was, thus, of an enhanced level of political consciousness due to the regime's "ideological outreach."

Nasser's ability to maintain support from these classes was a result of his effectiveness at maintaining the eudaemonic legitimacy of the social contract. Following the economic crises of the 1960's and the 1967 war, Nasser's legitimacy suffered. As the products of Nasser's education system, the newly educated were the most aware of the failings of the regime. Students were, therefore, the most vocal of critics as Nasser faced declining legitimacy.

The tumult following 1967 is relevant to the political process model in that it disrupted the political status quo. Doug McAdam specifies the various types of events which may alter a political environment: "Among the events and processes likely to prove disruptive of the political status quo are wars, industrialization, international political realignments, prolonged

unemployment, and widespread demographic changes.^{lxvii} Although McAdam's study does not deal directly with Egypt, his theory is clearly relevant to the aforementioned scenario. McAdam posits war as the primary factor in prompting a shift in the political status quo. Indeed, the 1967 war proved a watershed moment for Nasser's presidency with regards to opposition activism. Egyptians felt it necessary to transition from a state of "politics of withdrawal" to one of overt protest after the 1967 war. Additionally, the rapid industrialization of Nasser's presidency brought consciousness to a previously uneducated demographic, and provided for their ability to oppose the regime. A 1955 arms deal with Czechoslovakia was a political maneuver which placed Egypt among the Soviet cause at the height of the Cold War.^{lxviii} This event represented a shift in political alignment for Egypt previously within the British sphere of influence. Finally, although the Nasser era was not characterized by unemployment, the nature of the appointment policy diminished earning prospects for the "lumpen salariat" and contributed to a general sense of economic disillusionment. Each of these elements prompted the emergence of a favorable POS for opposition activism that was exploited by opposition entrepreneurs such as the Muslim Brotherhood.

Nasser's presidency concluded at a relatively low point in the greater context of his vast political achievements. His efforts provided for the basic welfarist policies that remained intact for many underprivileged Egyptians for decades. Similarly, his ideals provided for economic growth and oversaw the elimination of British hegemony. It may be concluded, however, that Nasser was primarily motivated to suppress opposition, and did so effectively until 1967. Much of his policy consideration was based in the logic of maintaining the power of his regime and undercutting powerful organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood. His

political maneuvering provided for his long tenure as president, which lasted until his death in 1970.

Nasser's policies of liberalization following the 1967 war indicate a visible trend of hybridization, and will apply to later decades of Egyptian history. Nasser's successor, Anwar El-Sadat is famous for his liberal economic policy known as the "*infitah*." I will later argue that the *infitah* was a direct continuation of the transition from strict authoritarianism under Nasser to a hegemonic party system under Sadat and Mubarak.

The “Believer President” Years (1970-1981)

The shifting political status quo of the final years of Nasser’s presidency led to early stages of hybridization. Economic turmoil threatened the sustainability of the welfare state, and the 1967 war discredited the Nasserist ideology of pan-Arabism and Arab socialism. A viable heuristic for observing the regime’s attitude shift is its approach to opposition activism. Popular unrest following the 1967 war forced Nasser to allow political organization on university campuses as a means for maintaining power. He also released a large number of political prisoners, many who belonged to the most prominent Islamist group, the Muslim Brotherhood. These reforms were harbingers of a more comprehensive transition from strict authoritarian rule to a hegemonic party system. Following Nasser’s death, the hybridization process also assumed a religious element under Anwar El Sadat who advertised his piety as a source of political legitimacy. Sadat’s appeal to his religiosity was consistent with his policy. His outward religiosity provided for state sponsorship of Islamic institutions and increased tolerance of Islamic opposition groups. Additionally, his efforts to liberalize the Egyptian economy further suggest the regime’s gradual hybridization. With regard to legitimacy, Sadat’s presidency will indicate his dependence on legal and religious legitimacy in contrast to Nasser’s charismatic-revolutionary and eudaemonic legitimacy.

The transition from Nasser to Sadat, although thoroughly characterized by policy shifts, represented a contrast in personality. Sadat relied on his Muslim identity as a definitive component of his public image. Known as the “Believer-President,” Sadat was diligent in supporting Islamic institutions. In conjunction with a revamped level of openness with regard to opposition politics, his regime utilized state resources for the promotion of Islam in public education and media programming.^{lxix} Sadat lacked the personal charisma of Nasser, and was

unable to rely on the legitimacy afforded to Nasser by his revolutionary zeal. The languid economy and the perceived failure of the secular ideology espoused by Nasser required Sadat to seek alternative sources of legitimacy. Al-Awadi elaborates on this political strategy: “[Sadat] used religious legitimacy when Islam seemed to support his policies.”^{lxx} His reliance on religiosity directly correlated to his promotion of lawfulness. Within the first year of his presidency, Sadat instituted major constitutional reforms, declaring Egypt the “State of Law.” This campaign entailed a cessation of political imprisonment and the promotion of a judiciary independent of the executive government.

Sadat’s relative tolerance toward Islamic groups extended to his treatment of the Muslim Brotherhood. Consistent with his “State of Law,” Sadat gradually released political prisoners taken into custody under Nasser. Nasser’s vehement opposition of the Muslim Brotherhood placed many seminal leaders of the organization in state custody. Sadat not only released most of the imprisoned Brothers, but he also returned many confiscated properties and resources. This renewed tolerance allowed exiled members of the Brotherhood to return to Egypt. As previously mentioned, Nasser liberalized his approach to political organizing on university campuses following the 1967 war. Sadat bolstered the effects of this policy shift by encouraging the Brotherhood to organize at the universities.

This strategy served to limit the influence of leftist groups vying for the support of the students.^{lxxi} While the Brotherhood enjoyed expanded liberties on university campuses, it effectively counterbalanced other opposition groups. The overt support of the “Believer-President” for Islamic policies manifested itself in the legal sector. By 1980, Sadat established Islamic *shari’a* as the “basic source for the national legal code” by way of constitutional amendment.^{lxxii} Some scholars consider these efforts as a preemptive action

against Islamist opposition. By embracing Islamic principles, Sadat discredited the Muslim Brotherhood's criticisms of secular governance. Similarly, the effective organizing of the Brotherhood on campuses limited the influence of other opposition groups and consolidated Sadat's political influence. Reformist Islamist groups ultimately replaced the left as the nation's leading opposition force.^{lxxiii}

The Muslim Brotherhood thrived under these circumstances and enjoyed a period of revival. Brotherhood leaders took advantage of Sadat's tolerance, and instituted various programs, which allowed for its resurgence. Through efforts like its "training programs," in which Brotherhood leaders would profess their views, the Brotherhood effectively mobilized Egypt's university students. The Brotherhood bolstered the renewed student support by instituting a number of civil service projects. Such efforts included financial support for textbooks and tuition as well as the provision of garments for women. Sadat's tolerance of the Brotherhood also extended to arenas beyond that of the university. By 1975, the Brotherhood initiated construction projects in underprivileged communities, providing schools, hospitals and medical clinics.^{lxxiv} These efforts allowed for the Muslim Brotherhood's emergence as a prominent non-governmental force: by 1977, it controlled the student associations of all thirteen Egyptian universities. The following year, it earned control of the General Union of Egyptian Students. Universities became the primary sites for opposition activism during the Sadat years.

The moderate stance assumed by the Muslim Brotherhood caused fragmentation among Islamist activists and led to the rise of more extreme ideologies. Sayyid Qutb, a prominent Brotherhood figure of the 1960's, is considered to be the founder of Islamic extremism. His writings called for struggle against Western hegemony, placing faith in a vanguard of

activists seeking to deliver the Muslim world from *jahiliya* – or ignorance. John Calvert characterizes the nature of Qutb's ideology:

Qutb's quest for a clear alternative to the hegemonic social and political order, in combination with his call to resist the powers-that-be in the pursuit of change, qualifies him as a radical. In contrast to the reformist trend within Islamism, which has sought to implement change gradually through a campaign of hearts and minds, Qutb's writings targeted the state, insisting that the elite either conform to the precepts of Islam or step down.^{lxxv}

Sadat's tolerance toward Islamist activism engendered the emergence of a range of Islamist ideologies, many of which coincided with Qutb's radicalism. The bifurcation was largely generational, as young activists sought a more immediate route to an Islamic society than the Brotherhood offered.^{lxxvi} The Brotherhood remained popular with students and young Egyptians, yet Qutb's ideologies also appealed to large segments of society. The Brotherhood's rapprochement with the regime dissuaded many of those who identified with the ideas of Qutb. One radical organization, Islamic Jihad, promoted violent tactics with a commitment to the precepts of *jihad* (struggle) against the *kafir* (apostate) state. A member of Islamic Jihad ultimately assassinated Sadat.

The Brotherhood's ascendance within the formal organizational structures of university leadership was a gradual process. Nasser's concessions to the university student communities following 1967 included the creation of the aforementioned General Union of Egyptian Students. The capacities of this union were enhanced under Sadat who instituted a less restrictive charter in 1976.^{lxxvii} Brotherhood leadership within the General Union motivated the publication of literature and pamphlets promoting the Islamist ideal. Sadat's strategies were also effective in mitigating the institutional strength of leftist organizations. This trend was exemplified by the Brotherhood's cooptation of Cairo University's faculty of engineering, a longstanding bastion of leftist activism.

Despite his liberalized approach to opposition activism, Sadat limited the emergence of official Islamist political parties. The Nasser era was one of single party political hegemony. In restricting political organization beyond the regime, Nasser sought to secure his position as the nation's leader. Sadat's dedication to the "State of Law" during the early years of his presidency contrasted sharply with Nasser's autocracy, and led to the formation of alternative political parties. In 1975, he recognized alternative political platforms within the Arab Socialist Union. The success of the centrist group within the ASU during the People's Assembly elections of 1976 indicated to Sadat the moderate tendencies of Egypt's voters.^{lxxviii} In response, he allowed the factions within the ASU to form legal political parties. Legitimate participation in Egypt's electoral system, although liberalized, remained limited by restrictions relating to party affiliation. Organizations based on class, religion or region were prohibited from forming official parties. This political maneuver excluded both the Nasserists, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood from participating. By the end of his presidency, Sadat sanctioned only three parties for political participation: Sadat's National Democratic Party and two opposition parties loyal to the regime.^{lxxix} The parliament, dominated by the NDP, remained an extension of the regime. Although Sadat's attempts at liberalization engendered a nascent multiparty system, he limited electoral competition and parliamentary independence. His actions also placed the Muslim Brotherhood in a position where the organization was tolerated by the regime, yet limited by electoral restrictions.

Sadat's liberalized approach to opposition activism emerged in conjunction with a revamped approach to international commerce. In April of 1974, Sadat presented the *October Paper* to the People's Assembly. This policy recommendation argued for an altered economic approach based on the following concepts: the imperative of modernizing Egypt,

the emboldening of the private sector and an increased flow of foreign capital. These underlying strategies comprised what became known as the *infitah*, or “Open-Door Policy.” The primary goal of modernization was to catalyze economic growth through policy change and foreign investment. Domestic economic policy previously limited the freedom of the private sector. Sadat sought to maximize the productivity of the private sector indicating a major shift from Nasser’s socialism. The final element of the *October Paper* sought to create more ideal conditions for foreign investment. Egypt was desperate for the flow of capital, and adjusted legislative restriction to secure the investments of foreigners.^{lxxx}

Economic policy under Nasser fundamentally weakened the state and provided logical justification for liberalization. Nasser’s relationship with the Soviet bloc formed a dependence on Eastern Europe as a market for Egyptian exports. Conversely, the majority of Egyptian imports came from Western nations. This type of import/export discrepancy in addition to the continuation of welfare state benefits depleted the regime’s stockpile of hard currency. Egypt was also lacking competitive technology, relying on the Soviets for innovation. Improved relations between the United States and the USSR allowed Egypt to seek Western investment as well as that from neighboring Arab countries. The oil price increase of 1973 left many Arab states with considerable wealth. Sadat’s regime sought to capitalize on this potential investment market, and thus, emerge from its previous economic isolationism.^{lxxxi}

Sadat’s *infitah* is consistent with the hybridization paradigm on two fronts. Economic stagnation prompted Sadat to seek new avenues for capital investment. The resultant “open-door policy” was a fundamental shift toward a free market, capitalist economy. In the process of economic liberalization, Sadat abandoned the socialist approach espoused by Nasser.

Rutherford's theory contends that both economic liberalization and ideological shifts are signals of hybridization.

Enactment of the *infitah* helped to improve Egyptian economic performance primarily due to foreign investment. Between 1973 and 1975, consumption increased from 63 percent of GDP to 75 percent. Imported consumer goods constituted the majority of this rise. As a result, Egypt's foreign exchange earnings were offset by the flow of imports. This trend did not dissuade oil-rich states from sending capital investments to Egypt. Within the same two-year period, Egypt enjoyed \$4.45 billion in investment from Arab states and Iran.^{lxxxii} This share of the oil wealth, however, was well below Egypt's expectations. The Egyptian GDP experienced real growth of 9 percent throughout the decade following 1974. Economists attribute this growth to the influx of foreign capital, rather than improved Egyptian economic strength.

Although popular with the middle class and the elite, Sadat's policies of political and economic liberalization drew criticism from the Islamist student organizations. Instituting the *infitah* led to a rise in foreign investment within Egypt. Although much of the initial investment stemmed from oil-rich Arab states, the West proved a reliable source of capital. Islamist groups, often associating with the writings of ideologues such as Sayyid Qutb, opposed the normalization of relations with Western powers. These groups became increasingly critical of the regime and its commitment to international capitalism.^{lxxxiii} The Islamist discontent toward the *infitah* culminated in 1977. Sadat's announcement to reduce state bread subsidies led to large-scale riots in cities throughout Egypt. More than 80 individuals died as a result of these demonstrations, and the aftermath saw damage to public institutions and the homes of government officials.^{lxxxiv} A joint effort between the police and

the military effectively quelled the riots. Although demonstrations had subsided, Islamist student publications took the opportunity to criticize the regime's failings. The Muslim Brotherhood newspaper, known as *al-Da'wa*, claimed that the *infitah* created new avenues for corruption in both the private and public sphere.

Criticism of his policies by Islamist groups prompted Sadat to limit freedom of expression and change his attitude toward the Muslim Brotherhood. The outward discontent of Islamist student organizations regarding the *infitah* placed Sadat in a "dilemma of legitimacy," described as an outcome of allowing more social freedoms in the context of authoritarianism.^{lxxxv} In September 1981, Sadat arrested many Brotherhood leaders and banned the publication of *al-Da'wa*. This crackdown was ineffective on college campuses, however, as the Brotherhood was too well integrated among the student populace. While the regime was capable of banning politically oriented meetings, the Brotherhood could justify gatherings as religious in nature.^{lxxxvi} Brotherhood-affiliated student groups actually grew in strength throughout this period, exercising their capacity to influence university policies. Their influence prompted reforms such as the provision of *hilar* food in all university cafeterias as well as an emphasis on bringing Islamic oriented speakers to campuses.

The Camp David Accords of September 1978 also enraged Islamist groups and motivated Sadat to limit his tolerance for opposition activism. As a general trend, Islamist organizations opposed the peaceful overtures to Israel by Sadat. Radical leaders emerged as the most outspoken critics on university campuses, alienating the moderate Islamists. This ideological shift within university groups prompted the regime to reverse its previous support of Islamic activity on campuses and withdraw financial support for student unions. Islamic groups were barred from holding summer camps during the summer of 1978, although such activities

resumed in 1979. Student union elections in 1979 drew heavily on the Camp David Accords as a campaign issue. These campaigns also thoroughly praised the Iranian Revolution, and expressed outrage at Sadat's offering of asylum to the Iranian shah.^{lxxxvii}

Sadat's actions during this period of civil unrest may be characterized as "authoritarian reversion," yet it did not prompt regime deposition due to the absence of system attribution. The PPMH paradigm suggests that as a regime revokes established democratic concessions, the result will be widespread civil unrest. Sadat effectively avoided regime deposition due to the limited scope of those affected. While Islamists represented a formidable opposition group, they did not constitute a majority of Egyptians. It is likely that Egyptians understood the repressive acts as limited to Islamists and other opposition groups. Participation cost for the majority of Egyptians was too high to warrant widespread civil unrest, and the regime remained intact.

Sadat responded to Islamist criticisms by furthering his efforts to portray himself as a devout Muslim. The People's Assembly passed several independent measures in May 1980, indicating Egypt's desire to reign in Islamist dissidents. Sadat proposed a constitutional amendment that established *shari'a* as the main source of legislation. The Law of Shame passed by referendum later that month. This measure declared the duty of each Egyptian citizen to uphold "basic values of society." Further, the Law of Shame made it a criminal act to negate the "divine teachings."^{lxxxviii} These efforts came in contrast to Sadat's decision to arrest leaders of major opposition groups in September 1981. He effectively detained 1,536 individuals, including nearly all of the prominent opposition figures.^{lxxxix} His intention was to weaken opposition until April 1982 when Israel was scheduled to return Sinai to Egypt as a

function of the peace negotiations. Instead of disabling his opposition, Sadat enraged them. He was assassinated the following month.

At face value, Sadat's presidency represented a dramatic ideological shift from the ideals espoused by Nasser. The reality of Sadat's tenure was in fact an adherence to authoritarian coercion. His policies did provide for the emergence of an extra-parliamentary political force in the Islamists, however, their alienation from the institutionalized means for political activity indicates Sadat's commitment to political dominance. The relative social and economic instability between 1967 and 1973 served as a POS and motivated the regime to liberalize. Liberalization under Nasser emerged primarily in the form of tolerance toward opposition activism. Sadat furthered this campaign by supporting Islamist activity at universities, especially with regards to student leadership. As previously stated, Sadat's efforts may have served as a means for diminishing the strength of other potential opposition from the political left. He also sought to embolden Islamists with the intent of earning the affections of the pious. While he garnered some support from moderate Islamists, economic liberalization and the Camp David Accords overshadowed any gains. Islamists saw Sadat's overtures to Western investment as a regression from the Islamic society they seek. Sadat's desperate attempts to counter this rationale emerged in the form of a constitutional amendment that heralded *shari'a* as the primary source of national legislation. When these efforts proved insufficient, Sadat was forced to exercise coercive measures against opposition groups through mass arrests.

Liberalization under Sadat, although minimal, represents a period of hybridization from strict authoritarianism to a "hegemonic party system." As the political process model contends, political instability and broad social processes tend to improve the bargaining

position of social insurgencies. The environment in Egypt following 1967 is consistent with the paradigm: social unrest as a result of military defeat. Criticism of the regime, although dampened by the 1973 “moral victory” over Israel, resumed again during the bread riots of 1977. Egyptians blamed the government and its policies for their plight. Similarly, many among the Islamists saw the *infitah* as an avenue for corruption both public and private. According to these social insurgents, it was the government of Sadat that caused socio-economic disparity and placed Egypt at risk of further conforming to Western rather than Islamic values.

Sadat’s coercion failed to distinguish between the moderate opposition factions and the extremists responsible for his demise. The mass arrests of September 1981 were an example of unilateral coercion toward opposition factions. Rather than determine those groups and individuals which presented a threat to the regime, Sadat chose to arrest leadership from nearly all opposition groups including leftist groups. In so doing, Sadat sought to control the agents of activism. Similarly, his decision to ban the Brotherhood publication, *al-Da’wa*, exemplified his quest to control the sites of activism. In limiting funding for student unions and banning Islamist summer camps, Sadat attempted to control the targets of activism. Each preceding example serves to indicate an authoritarian style of coercion against social insurgencies.

Sadat’s authoritarian tendencies transcended his quest for rational legitimacy as his presidency was characterized by appeals to religious and, more thoroughly, eudaemonic legitimacy. Rational legitimacy, as explained by Weber, is “dependent on the acceptance of certain formal rules and procedures that were rationally valid and legally binding.”^{xc} The “Believer-President” as an adherent to the tenets of Islam was aware of the expectations of

his Muslim subjects. His religiosity in conjunction with a renewed commitment to “State of Law” emerged as coordinated efforts to attain such rational legitimacy. By creating an independent judiciary as well as a multi-party electoral system, Sadat wished to frame himself as a non-coercive, democratic governor. Yet the multi-party system provided few opportunities for political dissent. Each emergent party was loyal to his National Democratic Party, and the People’s Assembly remained a tool for the advancement of regime policy. Similarly, he barred his most formidable opponents from forming official parties, which limited their participatory capacity.

The *infatih* may have served as an attempt by Sadat to establish eudaemonic legitimacy. Sadat maintained the Nasserist welfare policies throughout his tenure by guaranteeing public sector jobs to college graduates. During his tenure, enrollment at public universities more than doubled as private sector job prospects concurrently declined.^{xci} He was not ignorant to the economic stagnation that plagued his country, and decided to alter regime policy accordingly. Sadat’s motives behind creating an “open-door policy” were to inspire domestic entrepreneurship and to create economic competition. In spite of these efforts, real earning wages decreased significantly along with the annual GNP.^{xcii} More individuals were vying for few jobs in the private sector, and the exhaustion of state resources diminished the regime’s capacity to continue its entitlement program. Sadat was subject to both internal and external economic challenges, and he ultimately failed at establishing eudaemonic legitimacy.

Egypt under Sadat, while similar to the authoritarianism of Nasser, is indicative of a “hegemonic party system.” As previously stated, hybridization emerges as a result of crises, change in relative power and the dissolution of a regime’s ideals. The military defeat in 1967

and the subsequent economic tumult resonated in the early years of Sadat's presidency. These instances fulfill the crisis element of hybridization. Nasser's decision to liberalize student activism at universities, and Sadat's emboldening of Islamist groups served as a favorable POS for opposition activism. The relative power of the state waned in contrast to that of opposition groups who were thoroughly repressed prior to these concessions. McAdam would consider this to be an indication of an "improved bargaining position" for the social insurgency. The circumstances of Sadat's presidency also fulfilled Rutherford's criteria of dissolution of the regime's ideals. The *infitah* emerged in sharp contrast to Nasser's economic policies. In creating more opportunities for foreign and Western investment, Sadat pandered for support among the international community. He also promoted growth within the private sector, a further break from Nasser's socialism. The 1967 war signified the détente of Nasser's pan-Arabist ideology, and inspired the emergence of Islamism in Egypt.^{xciii} Sadat's institution of Egyptian capitalism indicates a shift in ideals from Nasser's era. The result was a regime that allowed for regular elections while subverting the participation of formidable opposition. Instead, the National Democratic Party maintained a monopoly on power and employed the People's Assembly as its tool. Thus, Sadat exercised a government under the auspices of a hegemonic party system.

The Era of Mubarak (1981-2011)

Hosni Mubarak was never a natural politician. His initial role as an air force pilot eventually segued to his ascent as a military officer. In 1975, he was appointed by Sadat to serve as the Egyptian vice-president, a tenure that allowed him limited political influence. It was not until Sadat's assassination in October 1981 that Mubarak earned true political influence in his assumption of the presidency. Mubarak's initial legitimacy was contingent on the Weberian principle of traditional legitimacy as Sadat's constitutionally mandated successor. He was not ignorant to the tenuous nature of this legitimacy, seeking to fortify it by continuing Sadat's process of liberalization. He made electoral concessions, expanding upon Sadat's multi-party system. From these adjustments emerged a tacit agreement between the regime and moderate Islamist groups, providing for enhanced opposition participation. Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood displayed effectiveness in political organizing, and ultimately rose to control the leadership of many professional syndicates while representing the largest opposition faction in the People's Assembly. These participatory allowances were incumbent on the Brotherhood's relative political quiescence. Despite this arrangement, Mubarak felt threatened by the growing Islamist opposition. The 1990's represented a period of mass repression against Islamist groups of all tendencies, including the moderate Muslim Brotherhood. Although Mubarak continued the process of liberalization, he was ultimately hindered by his desire to retain some autocracy. As a result, Mubarak's regime preserved the hegemonic party system established under Sadat.

The earliest years of Mubarak's presidency were characterized by an appeal to legal legitimacy. This process was initiated under Sadat's concept of "State of Law" and prompted the shift from revolutionary legitimacy. Mubarak's efforts to indicate a commitment to law

emerged by way of the judiciary. Legislative reforms provided for the consolidation of judicial power, and instituted an independent judge to head the Council of the Supreme Court. The Minister of Justice, a member of the executive branch, previously occupied this position. Mubarak's campaign for legal legitimacy was supplemented by legal actions against corrupt officials. The regime targeted high profile figures, such as Sadat's brother, and placed them on trial. These efforts were primarily symbolic: they were ephemeral, yet widely publicized.^{xciv}

Mubarak's quest to garner legal legitimacy was bolstered by his efforts to create a pluralist electoral system. An early reform of Mubarak's presidency was the creation of the "Parties' Committee," which granted legal-status to new parties. Only two parties emerged from this reform: the New Wafd and the Umma.^{xcv} Mubarak instituted an enhanced pluralist system, but he was unable to thoroughly regulate participation. During the 1984 elections, the Muslim Brotherhood, which was officially prohibited from forming a political party, participated in parliamentary elections under the banner of the New Wafd. The Wafd was considered a secular party and was therefore permitted to conduct an electoral campaign. The organizational strength of the Brotherhood provided a solid foundational electorate with which the coalition garnered 58 seats in the People's Assembly.

The subsequent elections in 1987 were subject to a similar strategic maneuver by the Brotherhood. The "Islamic Alliance" consisted of the Brotherhood, the Labor Party and the Liberal Party.^{xcvi} Each party was incentivized to participate in this tripartite faction. The Brotherhood required a legal method for entering elections, the Labor Party also sought the establishment of an Islamic state and the Liberal Party required the electoral support of the other two entities. This strategy provided for the emergence of a 60-seat opposition bloc in

the People's Assembly. Mubarak's multi-party electoral system represented a favorable POS. The leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood effectively exploited the situation, and further improved its bargaining position by way of parliamentary influence.

Nachman Tal argues that the alliance system was a failed strategy employed by the regime to bifurcate Islamic opposition. The Brotherhood's alliance with the Wafd prior to the 1984 elections improved its bargaining position. The 1987 elections yielded a similar result. Mubarak's attempts to limit electoral participation by Islamist groups ultimately facilitated the promotion of Islamic ideals in a more public forum:

The authorities had forced the Brotherhood to join a coalition with legitimate parties, but this had not deterred it from spreading the Islamic message directly to the public . . . the Brotherhood took full advantage of the forum in the People's Assembly. Overall, therefore, its strength and influence burgeoned in the 1980s.^{xcvii}

Although the Brotherhood remained officially banned due to Nasser's unilateral decision in 1956, it was able to participate in electoral politics by associating with like-minded parties. As a result, Mubarak's appeals to legal legitimacy provided the Brotherhood with greater political freedom.

The Brotherhood's electoral progress was supplemented by its efforts in the Egyptian professional syndicates. Although the regime's reasoning is unclear, it is undeniable that Mubarak designated professional syndicates as a tolerable venue for political opposition. He allowed the Brotherhood open competition for control of the syndicates' executive boards under the banner of the "Islamic Trend," a party formed during the Doctors' Association elections of 1984. Moderate success in this arena led to Brotherhood competition in a wide range of professional syndicates including "Engineers', Dentists', Scientists', Agronomists', Pharmacists', Journalists', Commercial Employees' and Lawyers' Association elections."^{xcviii}

The initial success of the Islamic Trend coincided with a significant increase in voter turnout. According to Wickham, aggregate participation in syndicate elections tripled between 1982 and 1992. Young membership represented the majority of voter increases, primarily due to its reliance on syndicate support. Nasser's entitlement program brought forth a wave of educated university graduates from non-elite backgrounds. The influx of educated youth within a stagnant economy left many individuals without work. The civil-society programs sponsored by Islamist groups often represented a source of employment for young professionals; doctors found employment in the Islamic clinics and hospitals. The young voters were, therefore, thoroughly inclined to support the Islamic Trend candidates.^{xcix}

Young voters were also motivated to support Islamic Trend candidates due to the services that the Brotherhood was capable of providing. During the 1970's the Brotherhood's provision of social services on university campuses garnered wide support among the voting student body. A similar strategy provided for the success of the Islamic Trend within the professional syndicates. The first of several major social service efforts occurred in 1985 with an organized sale of "durable goods" in Alexandria. Ahmad al-Nahas, the organizer of this event, was a Brotherhood leader at Alexandria University and later earned the position of treasurer of the Alexandria engineers' syndicate. Another social service effort occurred in 1986, as the Brothers helped subsidize health insurance for the Cairo medical syndicate.^c These types of services were essential for young syndicate members seeking to provide for their families. The Brotherhood was the beneficiary of increased syndicate membership as it was effective in securing the support of the emergent voting bloc.

The Brotherhood's ability to provide social services is consistent with the hybridization trajectory described by Rutherford. Mubarak's need for alternative sources of legitimacy led

to electoral reform in Egypt. His tolerance of opposition groups, primarily in the professional syndicates, indicates a desire to maintain power and circumvent criticism. Additionally, the faltering welfare state created a vacuum of social services, which was readily filled by the Brotherhood. The strong organizational capacity of the MB allowed it to exploit the favorable POS that forced regime hybridization.

The Brotherhood capitalized on Mubarak's relative tolerance by renewing its activities on university campuses. Sadat's 1979 action severely limited political activity on university campuses. As Sadat's heir, Mubarak upheld this provision and maintained the dissolution of representative student organizations. It was not until 1984 that the Brotherhood was able to resume its campus activism due to reforms of the Student Charter. The renewed liberties provided by the regime emerged in conjunction with greater security surveillance of Brotherhood activity.^{ci}

The Brotherhood's provision of social services culminated in 1992 following a devastating earthquake in Cairo. This natural disaster, which injured over 12,000 people and damaged over 50,000 buildings, was a viable opportunity for the Brotherhood to assist the populace. Syndicate leaders affiliated with the Islamic Trend were quick to organize first-aid centers, and distributed vital items such as food and medicine.^{cii} The regime's relief efforts were inefficient and slow in contrast. Similarly, the regime never fulfilled its promises of providing minor financial subsidies to families who lost a home or a breadwinner. Mubarak tried to prevent Brotherhood aid by instituting a ban on any relief efforts not sanctioned by the state. In doing so, Mubarak hoped to avoid widespread discontent resulting from system attribution.

In contrast to the organizational successes of the Muslim Brotherhood, the regime struggled with several economic recessions during the 1980's. The Arab world's population growth of the last several decades is particularly evident in Egypt. Between 1980 and 1995, the Arab world in general experienced the largest population boom of any region in the world. Thus, the populations in Arab countries are overwhelmingly youthful: 40 percent of Egyptians are under the age of 15.^{ciii} The burdened welfare state of the Nasserist system became further overextended as a result of this growth. This trend left large groups of university and secondary school graduates unemployed by the 1980's. In the same way that Nasser's enlightened citizens became his harshest critics after the 1967, so too did Mubarak's public at the failure of the entitlement program. Sheri Berman contends that this failure left the Egyptian state "increasingly estranged from its citizens."

The regime's own sense of insecurity in contrast to the Brotherhood's organizational competency prompted the regime to limit the organization's freedoms. The economic crises that characterized the late 1980's and early 1990's occurred in concurrence with an escalation in Islamic terrorist violence. According to Tal, "the first four years of the 1990s were the bloodiest of the entire century in Egypt."^{civ} The rise in Islamic terrorism is a product of a range of environmental factors, yet data indicates a correlation between poor economic conditions and terrorist violence.^{cv} In an effort to reassert its control over Egypt, the regime created The Law to Guarantee Democracy Within the Professional Syndicate Associations in 1993. This legislation mandated minimum participation rates in association elections and voided any election failing to include 50 percent of eligible voters in the first round, and 33 percent in the second round.^{cvi} A panel of judges appointed by the regime determined the result of any election failing to meet these requirements. The Islamic Trend was often reliant

on a politically active minority competing against indifferent syndicate members. The law clearly targeted the electoral strategies of the Brotherhood and sought to limit its political influence.^{cvii} Passage of this law prompted public demonstrations led by Brotherhood and other Islamist activists. The protests were small in scale, and remained non-violent. This is significant because it indicates the political quiescence of Brotherhood leadership, which “deliberately chose to avoid major escalation of conflict that could have led to a violent showdown with the regime.”^{cviii}

Electoral repression surfaced alongside legal reforms that broadened the state’s capacity to apprehend Islamists. The high levels of terrorism during this era led to the passage of a 1992 anti-terrorism law. This piece of legislation allowed Mubarak’s security apparatus to arrest anyone for three days without a criminal charge. The law included a provision to lengthen prison sentences for those convicted of “assisting or expressing sympathy for terrorists.”^{cxix} Suspected militants were tried in military courts with lenient rules for submitting evidence with no opportunity for appeal. At this point, the regime “stopped distinguishing between the MB and the militants.”^{cx} Non-violent Brotherhood activists were often subject to these unfair trial procedures. In 1995, the military courts imprisoned fifty-four Brotherhood leaders for involvement in an illegal organization while simultaneously ordering the closure of Brotherhood headquarters in Cairo.^{cxii}

Mubarak’s campaign against the Brotherhood continued throughout the 1990’s and included efforts to damage the organization’s public image. The regime, which refused to recognize the moderate leanings of the Brotherhood, publicly referred to the organization as “illegal” and equated it with militant Islamist groups.^{cxiii} Two events allowed the regime to portray the organization as such. The first occurred in 1992 as Mubarak’s security apparatus

uncovered a cache of documents that indicated a plot by the Brotherhood to overthrow the regime and seize power. Nachman Tal elaborates on the content of the documents:

The document stated that the keystone of the plan was the Muslim Brotherhood's entry into public sectors and takeover of certain groups The document also specifically referred to the army and police as targets for seizure by the Brotherhood.^{cxiii}

Tal does not question the legitimacy of these allegations, as they resulted in the imprisonment of some Brotherhood leaders. The second event took place several years later in 1999 in the context of syndicate leadership. Security officers stormed the Engineers' Association office in Cairo where some Brotherhood leaders were discussing future initiatives. Sixteen leaders were arrested and convicted of belonging to a banned organization among other subversive allegations.

Although Tal does not speak to the validity of the uncovered cache of documents, its mere existence does not negate the Brotherhood's status as a moderate Islamist group. The question of the Brotherhood's moderate nature is one of contention among scholars of the Middle East. Abdel Monem Said Aly describes the MB's proposed government structure based on the new party program as authoritarian and anti-democratic: "the state is to play a highly interventionist role in running the economy and society adopt[ing] a bellicose foreign policy based on the increasing militarization of the state."^{cxiv} Although Said Aly's postulation is supported by textual evidence found in the Brotherhood platform, it is negated by the organization's adherence to peaceful, democratic practices for several decades. Robert Leiken and Steven Brooke unequivocally proclaim the Brotherhood's commitment to peaceful activism, stating "all [Brothers] reject global jihad while embracing elections and other features of democracy."^{cxv} The position of Leiken and Brooke is supported by the scholarship of Israel Elad-Altman, who states that a specific Brotherhood leader "sees

democracy as more than just an unavoidable means of reaching power: It is a unique fruit of human experience that has intrinsic value.^{cxvi} The adherence to democratic processes directly contrasts with opinions of Islamist extremists, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri of Al-Qaeda, who consider democracy an “unforgivable sin” since it gives man sovereignty over Allah.^{cxvii}

The 1992 cache discovery may not have been a regime fabrication, yet its contents exist only as an ideal. The Brotherhood has indicated its commitment to democracy through practice, and its willingness to form electoral coalitions with secularists, nationalists and liberals. The most lucid indication of the Brotherhood’s commitment to democracy and social improvement emerged in the People’s Assembly following the 2005 electoral successes, which I will describe later. The following is a description of the legislative efforts of the Brotherhood in recent years:

Instead of pursuing a divisive religious or cultural agenda, the Brotherhood has pushed for more affordable housing, criticized the government's handling of the avian flu threat, and demanded accountability for the recent series of bus, train, and ferry disasters.^{cxviii}

Despite being the largest opposition group in the People’s Assembly with 88 seats, the Brotherhood did not attempt to further Islamize the Egyptian government in the image of Said Aly’s description. Rather, the group sought social reforms with the intent of benefitting all Egyptians without regard to religious affiliation. The legislative measures described above neither reflect the ideas of the cache, nor are they reminiscent of Said Aly’s description. The only credible method for determining the Brotherhood’s status as moderate or extremist exists in analysis of reality, rather than reacting to a description of an organizational ideal.

Government coercion of the Brotherhood extended beyond the political arena as the regime also co-opted religious institutions. Initial efforts to limit Brotherhood influence in

the religious sphere included the confiscation of sites of religious mobilization such as organizational literature. A unilateral action in 1993 placed private mosques under the auspices of the Ministry of Religious Endowments. The regime mandated that only approved individuals could sermonize in nationalized mosques. Similarly, the regulations for establishing new mosques were intensified in order to limit Islamist involvement.^{cxix}

Nationalization of private mosques ultimately failed due to several factors. The process was costly, and the strict scrutiny of imams prompted a dearth of professionals to serve the religious community. The regime, however, was now able to oversee the charitable donations collected by mosques. This money was previously channeled to Islamist political organizations as well as charities. As a result, the government could impede the flow of resources to groups that challenged its legitimacy.

The Mubarak regime also sought religious legitimacy through a process known as “cosmetic Islamization.” These appeals to the religious public manifested themselves in various forms the most visible of which was heavy taxes on imported liquor. Mubarak also increased state funding for Islamic media programming and provided the newly nationalized mosques with politically oriented literature on subjects pertinent to Islam. *Al-Da’wa*, the Brotherhood publication, remained banned due to the repressive actions of Sadat near the end of his presidency.^{cxx} These efforts came in tandem with a new reliance on Islamic rhetoric in public discourse. Egyptian officials began to incorporate quotations from religious texts and justify state actions based on *shari’a*.^{cxxi}

Repressive tactics continued to characterize Mubarak’s treatment of the Brotherhood into the subsequent decade. Beginning in March 2005, the Brotherhood organized a series of demonstrations throughout the country demanding political reforms from the government.

The regime responded with strength, arresting nearly 1,500 Brotherhood members including high-ranking officials. The demonstrations continued for several months and ultimately ended by the summer of 2005. Analysis by Israel Elad-Altman contends that the demonstrations were primarily a strategic decision by Brotherhood officials to appease the younger organizational membership. Emergent opposition movements such as *Kifaya* vocally challenged Mubarak's legitimacy during this period. Many younger members of the Brotherhood movement were critical of the organization's absence from this discourse and were eager to criticize Mubarak's repressive measures. Brotherhood leadership maintains that it notified government officials of the time, place and number of participants prior to all but one demonstration.^{cxvii}

By October 2005, all Muslim Brothers were released from prison marking the first time in a decade that Egyptian jails were empty of Brotherhood members. This outcome may have proven a result of an agreement between Brotherhood leadership and the Mubarak regime.

Elad-Altman provides an account of this alleged pact:

The MB then allegedly reached a deal with the regime in which MB prisoners would be gradually released (lower-ranking members first, as a cover); the MB would continue to hold small-scale protests to appease its rank and file, but would coordinate these demonstrations with the authorities and not with other opposition groups; and the MB would not support any of the opposition presidential candidates.^{cxviii}

Although the Brotherhood has denied the existence of such an agreement, it has never provided an alternative explanation for the abrupt ending of demonstrations and the unilateral release of prisoners affiliated with the organization. Such a pact would indicate the increasingly moderate stance of the Brotherhood and its willingness to compromise with the regime. Progress in the electoral realm is essentially a method for the regime to control agents of opposition activism. The Brotherhood was never wholly invested in achieving the

reforms for which it demonstrated. Instead, those efforts were a political maneuver to please young activists. The abrupt end of the demonstrations and the regime's release of the Brothers both exemplify Wickham's theory of Brotherhood practice: "a shift from direct confrontation with the regime to a cautious and grudging accommodation."^{cxixiv}

Efforts by the Muslim Brotherhood to gain the regime's approval as a legitimate political entity influenced its maneuvers during the 2005 parliamentary elections. Due to the official ban on religious political parties, a candidate affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood was required to run as an independent or rely on a secular party coalition. This pattern shifted in 2005 when the Brotherhood decided to officially abandon its guise. Candidates advertised their direct affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood. Islamist student leadership on university campuses also complied with this shift proclaiming their allegiance to the Brotherhood. This decision was an overt attempt by the organization to gain official party recognition from the regime. In an overture to the regime, the Brotherhood refused to nominate candidates in districts previously held by senior members of parliament.^{cxixv}

These elections yielded the largest historical parliamentary opposition force. During the fall 2005 voting period, the Muslim Brotherhood candidates effectively garnered 20% of the parliamentary seats. It is likely that they could have attained more seats if the regime had not intervened in the later rounds of voting.^{cxixvi} The Brotherhood's success rate was relatively high: nearly half of its candidates won their elections. Mubarak's regime acted in response and further reiterated the ban on religious parties. Other electoral alterations by the regime included the institution of a minimum quota for female representatives, and a "feebly staffed, government-appointed electoral commission" replaced judicial electoral oversight.^{cxixvii}

Mubarak's measures to inhibit the strength of parliamentary opposition proved effective in the 2010 elections. The newly instituted electoral commission ensured the privacy of the regime's electoral control by banning cameras from voting sites. There were also appeals by foreign governments seeking to oversee the elections, all of which were rejected by the regime.^{cxxviii} According to the Muslim Brotherhood's English-language website, 2010 experienced the largest detainment campaign of Brotherhood members in Egyptian history. A total of 6,001 Brothers were imprisoned throughout the country, 578 lawsuits were filed against the organization, and 106 Brotherhood-owned businesses were forcibly closed.^{cxxix} As the preliminary round of voting ended in December, the Brotherhood realized the extent of the regime's influence. An 88-seat minority opposition once again became an extra-parliamentary entity: the Brotherhood won 0 seats. This outcome is widely attributed to the fraud and rigging of Mubarak's sympathetic electoral council.^{cxxx} Mubarak's meddling prompted the Brotherhood to boycott later rounds of the elections in which several of its candidates were competing in runoffs.^{cxxxi}

This flagrant violation of democratic principles was a harbinger of Mubarak's political demise. The multi-party electoral system reached its apex in 2005 with the success of the Muslim Brotherhood. The overt fraud executed by the Mubarak regime in 2010 was especially poignant in the wake of the previous elections. In contrast to previous authoritarian regressions, Mubarak's actions threatened the suffrage of the entire Egyptian populace, whereas Sadat's coercion specifically targeted Islamists. Egyptians were thoroughly motivated to defend their democratic capital, and participation cost no longer deterred civil unrest. As a result, Mubarak was forced to resign in February 2011, only months after his most blatant authoritarian regression.

The early years of Mubarak's presidency were characterized by conciliatory actions on the part of the regime to allow for greater opposition participation. The emergence of the Parties' Commission led to the approval of several opposition parties with whom the Muslim Brotherhood collaborated leading to some immediate electoral gains. Mubarak's decision to create the commission in conjunction with his decision to assign independent judiciary oversight of elections exemplified his quest to attain legal legitimacy. Mubarak inherited a moderate level of traditional legitimacy as Sadat's constitutionally mandated successor. His limited political experience, however, prompted his quest for more secure forms of legitimacy. As a result, Mubarak released multitudes of political prisoners detained under Sadat while liberalizing the electoral process in both parliamentary and syndicate arenas. Legislative measures endorsed by Mubarak also prompted the resurgence of Islamist activism on university campuses, a tradition that languished in the final years of Sadat's presidency.

Mubarak's concessions to opposition groups served to create a favorable POS. As new avenues for political mobilization emerged, opposition groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood made tangible gains among the populace. The policy failures of the regime engendered a large group of unemployed graduates known as the "lumpen salariat." These individuals were dependent on the civil society initiatives of Islamist organizations for essential services. By providing employment and other benefits such as health insurance to this young and disillusioned populace, the Muslim Brotherhood effectively earned control of many major professional syndicates. The strategy of coopting a large group of like-minded individuals is known as "bloc recruitment." The Brotherhood garnered support from this bloc, allowing it to attain an improved bargaining position with the regime as a result.

The Brotherhood's improved bargaining position was not effective in deterring the regime's repressive tactics. Although the Brotherhood adhered to established channels of political participation, it was unable to bifurcate the political elite. This is primarily a result of Mubarak's dependence on the hegemonic party system established by Sadat. Mubarak allowed for elections, and initially tolerated electoral gains by opposition groups, yet his National Democratic Party remained dominant. If the Egyptian system was not as thoroughly authoritarian, it is likely that the Brotherhood's moderate position (in contrast to militant Islamist groups) and its utilization of established channels of participation would have created a divided elite. Instead, the regime was able to force legislative measures through the parliament in order to restrict the Brotherhood's capacity to dominate the syndicates.

Other limitations imposed by the regime sought to avoid a phenomenon of system attribution by the disillusioned populace. The organizational strength of the Muslim Brotherhood became thoroughly apparent following the 1992 earthquake in Cairo. Brotherhood activists were the first to offer relief to thousands of devastated victims, many who lost homes or breadwinners. The regime's slow reaction motivated Mubarak's decision to ban humanitarian aid from any non-state purveyor. In so doing, Mubarak hoped to avoid a widespread accusation of state failure in contrast to the efficiency of the Brotherhood.

Mubarak's maintenance of the hegemonic party system led to his attempted cooptation of sites, agents and targets of mobilization. As previously established, Mubarak's concessions to opposition parties provided for their prominent emergence in various arenas. The professional syndicates, however, proved the most viable as sites of political mobilization. The bloc recruitment that occurred within the syndicates allowed the Brotherhood to promote its ideals. Parliament also served as an avenue for ideological outreach, as Brotherhood-

affiliated members would criticize political corruption among the elite and attempt to pass legislation compatible with *shari'a*. A 1993 law endorsed by Mubarak targeted Brotherhood mobilization strategies, effectively coopting viable sites of mobilization.

Mass arrests by Mubarak's security apparatus indicate the regime's desire to control the agents of activism. The first of such measures occurred in 1992 after the passage of a stringent anti-terrorism law. Within the first several months of this law's institution, the security apparatus uncovered a cache of documents, leading to the arrest of several major Brotherhood leaders. Another action in 1995 brought 52 Brotherhood leaders to prison and a simultaneous closure of the Brotherhood's Cairo headquarters. Mubarak resorted to similar tactics in 1999 and 2010, the latter representing the most repressive year during the Mubarak presidency. Mass arrests of Brotherhood leadership allowed Mubarak to limit the organization's outreach and weaken the agents of mobilization.

Mubarak's overtures to the religious community suggest an effort to coopt the targets of mobilization. The Muslim Brotherhood, as the name suggests, is an organization founded on the principles of Islam seeking to establish an Islamic state. Its religious principles often resonate with the Muslim community who tend to consider Islamist groups as the arbiters of morality due to their piousness.^{cxxxii} During his presidency, Mubarak employed "cosmetic Islamization," which consisted of minor legislative measures seeking to appeal to the religious community. Similarly, he attempted to gain control of the nation's mosques. While the mosques physically represent sites of activism, Mubarak was more interested in implementing a loyal network of imams to preach to the Egyptian citizens. A campaign of this nature intends to control the message to which religious communities are exposed.

Mubarak's attempt to usurp the Brotherhood's support base is a clear indication of his desire to control the targets of activism.

Mubarak's long presidency was primarily an extension of the hegemonic party system. His appeals to legal and religious legitimacy were overshadowed by his overt acts of coercion against opposition groups. Although he allowed for some liberalization within the electoral sphere, the final parliamentary elections of his presidency indicate a reliance on hegemony in order to maintain power. 2010, the final year of Mubarak's reign, witnessed the most blatant authoritarian reversion. The fraudulent nature of the electoral outcome was especially poignant following the 2005 elections, which saw the emergence of the largest opposition bloc in Egyptian parliamentary history. It is, therefore, unsurprising that Mubarak's ouster took place within months of the preliminary round of parliamentary elections. Although Islamists were not at the forefront of the 2011 protests, the general disregard for democratic principles likely toppled Mubarak's hegemony.

Conclusion

This paper applies the political process model of hybridization (PPMH) to the case of the Muslim Brotherhood during the reign of the Free Officers' regime. PPMH seeks to define a multifaceted paradigm of political change as it occurs for both a social insurgency and an established regime. The political process model (PPM), on which PPMH is based, suggests that broad social processes form political opportunity structures (POS) that can be exploited by social insurgencies. A social movement supported by strong leadership can exploit a favorable POS in order to force change in the political status quo.

PPMH is also based on the concept of regime hybridization, which accounts for change within the established regime. Rutherford describes several criteria that prompt an authoritarian regime to liberalize by adopting certain democratic functions. These criteria are similar to McAdam's description of broad social processes, and may be considered equivalent. PPMH, therefore, contends that while broad social processes create favorable POS's for a social insurgency, they also lead to regime hybridization.

Once a regime adopts certain democratic functions, authoritarian reversion may lead to civil unrest. The regime will only face widespread civil unrest and risk deposition when authoritarian reversion threatens aggregate democratic rights rather than those of an isolated minority group. A threat to aggregate democratic rights will likely lead to system attribution: a phenomenon where the populace attributes its grievances to the actions of the regime. Widespread civil unrest may yield a range of outcomes, one of which is regime deposition.

The PPMH in Egypt officially began following the 1967 war with Israel. Nasser faced widespread civil unrest in the wake of a humiliating military defeat. Rather than employing means of coercion to suppress the dissidents, he chose to liberalize his approach to

opposition activism. Nasser's decision to provide democratic concessions not only initiated PPMH, but it also represented a shift in his basis for legitimacy. This appeal to democracy suggested Nasser's desire to maintain power, which he did until his death in 1970.

Sadat's efforts at establishing religious legitimacy represented the next significant step in the PPMH. The Muslim Brotherhood, thoroughly repressed under Nasser, exploited few favorable POS's due to the regime's cooptation of sites and targets of activism. The "Believer President," in contrast, embraced Islam as a component of his public image, further liberalizing the regime's approach to opposition activism. The university became the primary site for Brotherhood activism, and students became the primary targets for recruitment. The Brotherhood's leadership exploited the POS provided by Sadat's liberalized politics and furthered its agenda as a social insurgency: to change to political status quo.

The authoritarian reversal that occurred at the end of Sadat's presidency did not lead to regime deposition due to its limited scope. Islamist criticism of regime policies prompted Sadat to revoke certain democratic functions. The resultant authoritarian reversion occurred almost exclusively at the universities. As a result, only Islamists and students were affected. The mass arrests that took place in 1982 were also limited to opposition groups. Although many different opposition groups were affected, the majority of Egyptians considered the participation cost of activism too high. Similarly, the arrests were not considered to be a threat to aggregate democratic rights, and Sadat successfully avoided system attribution.

Another major milestone in this application of PPMH was the multi-party electoral system that emerged under Mubarak. Although Sadat established the multi-party precedent, the Brotherhood was unable to exploit that POS until 1984. Mubarak sought to establish rational legitimacy, and further liberalized the regime as a result. At that point, the

Brotherhood entered a new era during which it functioned through established means of political participation: its avenues for activism were no longer limited to the universities.

The Brotherhood also exploited the emergent POS through bloc recruitment. The “lumpen salariat” that emerged from Nasser’s appointment policy were thoroughly disadvantaged by the failure of Egypt’s welfare state. The group was plagued by unemployment, and those who had jobs saw the value of their salary wane. The government’s inability to aid this group left a leadership void that was readily filled by the Brotherhood. The most poignant example of this phenomenon occurred in 1992 following the Cairo earthquake. Brotherhood activists were diligent about providing services to victims, whereas the government was ineffective in the same arena. As a means for circumventing system attribution, Mubarak instituted a unilateral ban on the provision of services by organizations lacking government approval. Throughout this process, the Brotherhood gained many supporters among the lumpen salariat and improved its bargaining position.

The rise in terrorism during the 1990’s motivated Mubarak’s authoritarian reversal. Islamist groups were responsible for high levels of violent activity throughout Egypt. Mubarak responded with a heavy hand, arresting many Islamist leaders from a range of organizations. As with Sadat’s actions in 1982, Mubarak’s efforts to contain terrorism were not considered a threat to aggregate democratic rights, and there was no potential for system attribution.

The Brotherhood most effectively exploited the multi-party electoral system POS during the 2005 parliamentary elections. Campaigning and organizing by the Brotherhood leaders yielded the largest parliamentary opposition faction in Egyptian history. The Brotherhood

utilized its access to established means of political participation, and garnered significant political clout.

The authoritarian reversal that followed the 2005 elections was considered a threat to aggregate democratic rights and led to system attribution. The Brotherhood's victory in 2005 was widely considered a triumph of Egyptian democracy. The regime's allowance of fair elections established a democratic precedent. The blatant disregard for individual suffrage that took place in 2010 was an authoritarian reversal that was not isolated to opposition groups. Instead, Mubarak threatened the entire foundation of Egyptian democracy. Participation cost was no longer a deterrent for many Egyptians. The result was widespread civil unrest that led to the deposition of Mubarak's regime.

The initiation of the PPMH under Nasser and the regime's deposition under Mubarak represent a full cycle. As hybridization took place, the Brotherhood exploited favorable POS's in order to further shift the political status quo. While authoritarian reversals were not limited to Mubarak's presidency, his final reversal was considered a threat to aggregate democratic rights. Egyptians opposed this on a large scale, and successfully removed Mubarak from his position as president.

The future of Egyptian democracy is difficult to predict. The state is currently within the control of the military, which intends to hold free and fair elections in 2011. It is safe to assume that the Muslim Brotherhood, with its superior organizational capacity, will enjoy electoral success in any situation. Regardless of the electoral outcome, it is imperative that the United States and the West support Egyptian democratic institutions. Now that Egyptians have determined a standard for their democracy, it is unlikely that an authoritarian regime will reemerge.

APPENDIX A

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- ⁱ The Constitution of the Muslim Brotherhood.
- ⁱⁱ Mitchell 66.
- ⁱⁱⁱ Despatch 1066 of November 6, 1950. "Reemergence of Moslem Brotherhood Society."
- ^{iv} Mitchell 81.
- ^v Tal 5.
- ^{vi} McAdam 37. (1982)
- ^{vii} Al-Awadi 4.
- ^{viii} Al-Awadi 9.
- ^{ix} Al-Awadi 10.
- ^x Eligur 17.
- ^{xi} McAdam 43. (1982)
- ^{xii} McAdam 45. (1982)
- ^{xiii} McAdam 12. (1982)
- ^{xiv} McAdam 67. (1986)
- ^{xv} Wickham 9.
- ^{xvi} Wickham 10.
- ^{xvii} McAdam 58. (1982)
- ^{xviii} Rutherford 17.
- ^{xix} Constitution. II. 2. E.
- ^{xx} Constitution. Foreword.
- ^{xxi} Botman 122.
- ^{xxii} Botman 105.
- ^{xxiii} Botman 74.
- ^{xxiv} Botman 105.
- ^{xxv} Rubin 41.
- ^{xxvi} Despatch 240 of February 10, 1950. "Status of the Moslem Brotherhood Society."
- ^{xxvii} Despatch 1396 of December 14, 1950. "Statement by Moslem Brotherhood Vice-President."
- ^{xxviii} Despatch 363 of March 1, 1950. "Moslem Brothers."
- ^{xxix} Despatch A-20 of January 9, 1950.
- ^{xxx} Despatch 70 of January 25, 1950. "Moslem Brothers."
- ^{xxxi} Despatch 240 of February 10, 1950. "Status of Moslem Brotherhood Society."
- ^{xxxii} Tal 19.
- ^{xxxiii} Tal 20.
- ^{xxxiv} Mitchell 66.
- ^{xxxv} Despatch 1463 of December 20, 1950. "Trial of the Moslem Brothers."
- ^{xxxvi} Mitchell 96-101.
- ^{xxxvii} Mitchell 101.
- ^{xxxviii} Mitchell 103-4.
- ^{xxxix} Mitchell 151.
- ^{xl} Wickham 23.
- ^{xli} Al-Awadi 32.
- ^{xlii} Weber 20.
- ^{xliii} Rutherford 132.
- ^{xliv} Al-Awadi 32.
- ^{xlv} Botman 81.
- ^{xlvi} Wickham 25.
- ^{xlvii} Wickham 28.
- ^{xlviii} Wickham 31.
- ^{xliv} Wickham 28.
- ^l Rutherford 133.
- ^{li} Wickham 25.

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- lii Wickham 26.
liii Wickham 26.
liv Rutherford 133.
lv Al-Awadi 32.
lvi Al-Awadi 32.
lvii Rutherford 81.
lviii Al-Awadi 33.
lix Al-Awadi 33.
lx Rutherford 135.
lxi Al-Awadi 34.
lxii Rutherford 135.
lxiii Al-Awadi 35.
lxiv Wickham 32.
lxv Wickham 32.
lxvi Al-Awadi 35.
lxvii McAdam 41. (1982)
lxviii Rutherford 132.
lxix Wickham 95.
lxx Al-Awadi 37.
lxxi Rutherford 82.
lxxii Gorman 149.
lxxiii Wickham 34.
lxxiv Rutherford 83.
lxxv Calvert 2-3.
lxxvi Wickham 114.
lxxvii Wickham 116.
lxxviii Wickham 65.
lxxix Wickham 65.
lxxx Ikram 17-8.
lxxxI Ikram 20.
lxxxii Baker 145. (1990)
lxxxiii Wickham 96.
lxxxiv Al-Awadi 44.
lxxxv Al-Awadi 45.
lxxxvi Beattie 204.
lxxxvii Beattie 252-3.
lxxxviii Beattie 262.
lxxxix Beattie 273.
xc Al-Awadi 4.
xci Berman 261.
xcii Berman 260.
xciii Berman 261.
xciv Al-Awadi 54.
xcv Al-Awadi 55.
xcvi Tal 50.
xcvii Tal 54.
xcviii Wickham 184.
xcix Wickham 188.
c Al-Awadi 97.
ci Al-Awadi 94.
cii Rutherford 86.
ciii Berman 14.
civ Tal 81.
cv Tal 88.
cvi Wickham 200.

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- cvi Wickham 187.
cviii Wickham 201.
cix Rutherford 87.
cx Rutherford 86.
cxi Wickham 201.
cxii Wickham 201.
cxiii Tal 58.
cxiv Said Aly 6.
cxv Leiken and Brooke 108.
cxvi Elad-Altman 26. (2009)
cxvii Leiken and Brooke 111.
cxviii Leiken and Brooke 114.
cxixcxix Tal 43.
cxx Tal 39.
cxxi Berman 16.
cxxii Elad-Altman 32. (2009)
cxxiii Elad-Altman 32. (2009)
cxxiv Wickham 193.
cxxv Elad-Altman 34. (2009)
cxxvi Strategies 18.
cxxvii The Economist.
cxxviii The Economist.
cxxix IkhwanWeb.
cxxx Worth.
cxxxii "Egypt: Rivals Pull Out of Elections, Citing Fraud." *The New York Times*. Associated Press, 1 Dec. 2010.
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cxxxii Wickham 157.

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